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ABSTRACT
Sf se puede... ^leer? Assessing Success of the Cuban and Nicaraguan Literacy Initiatives
(Under the direction of Douglass Sullivan-Gonzalez)
This research examines the literacy programs conducted in 1961 Cuba and 1980
Nicaragua. Given the similarities in the structure and implementation of the plan as well
as the congruencies in rhetoric promoting the plans, this thesis explores the various
internal and external variables that affected each country’s program to better understand
the widely different results. To research these countries’ programs, I examined both
primary and secondary source material related to each country, their educational
programs specifically, as well as information about US foreign policy relationships with
the countries during this time. Although both programs were initially successful in
reducing illiteracy rates, the Cuban program remains the more sustainable success of the
two educational endeavors. The Cuban government’s substantial and sustained
investment in infrastructure including roads, and schools, in the years following the
official close of the Cuban Literacy Campaign most contributed to the country’s overall
success in addressing illiteracy. The inability to reinvest in their state educational system
and the lack of domestic stability rendered Nicaragua unable to maintain the lower levels
of illiteracy attained during the “crusade.
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Introduction
Political revolution, restoration, and nearly constant turmoil characterized the
twentieth century experiences of many countries in Latin America; Cuba and Nicaragua
serve as no exceptions. Although unique from one another, the histories of Cuba and
Nicaragua converge at some points. The most notable convergence included the
development and implementation of several social reform programs by the revolutionary
parties soon after attaining power in each country. Following the removal of long
standing dictators, the victorious revolutionary parties in Cuba and Nicaragua began
ambitious programs dedicated to social reform. These programs included initiatives
relating to public health, voter initiatives, infrastructure projects, and most importantly.
education.
Shortly after gaining power, the newly established ruling groups in Cuba and
Nicaragua launched literacy programs to combat the high levels of illiteracy within each
country. Designed to be short-term, high intensity efforts focused on rural regions, the
Cuban Literacy Campaign of 1961 and Nicaragua’s 1980 National Literacy Crusade
depended primarily on the work of volunteers to reach out to illiterate populations across
each country to teach them basic language and math skills. Within months, both
programs dramatically reduced levels of Spanish illiteracy within their respective nations
and received similar prizes from UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific, and
Cultural Organization) for their efforts to address illiteracy.
This thesis examines how Cuba and Nicaragua similarly designed, structured, and
implemented their literacy programs as part of their revolutionary social programs. It also

Nicaragua; 1980 Nadhezhda K. Krupskaya Literacy Award; Cuba: 2006 King Sejong Literacy Prize
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considers the various internal as well as external externalities that benefitted or negatively
impacted each program. Finally, this research demonstrates the extent to which these
various internal and external factors affected Cuba and Nicaragua’s ability to both carry
out the programs initially and then preserve the gains made during each one. Although
both programs were initially successful in reducing illiteracy rates, the Cuban program
remains the more sustainable success of the two educational endeavors.
Colombia, Brazil, Peru, Chile and Costa Rica experienced similar political and
social turmoil and achieved at least some degree of success through the implementation
of their own literacy programs. Cuba and Nicaragua structured, organized and
implemented similarly, and both countries attained some degree of success in addressing
illiteracy through these programs. Each country experienced a different level of success
and sustainability in its efforts to address illiteracy. A comparative study of Cuban and
Nicaraguan programs will illuminate the numerous internal and external variables that
explain the disparate outcomes reached by programs so seemingly similar in structure and
content.
Although the literacy programs implemented in each country mirror one another
in many ways, the relationship between these two countries extends beyond the
congruities in their respective literacy initiatives and other social improvement programs.
According to Robert Pastor, the very origins of the conflicts in Nicaragua and Cuba
correlated in that they [along with Mexico’s earlier revolution] “began as crises of
political succession and only succeeded because virtually the entire nation agrees that the
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problem was the dictator.”" Struggling against similar political repression beneath
dictatorial control, leaders in Cuba and Nicaragua (specifically members of the Sandinista
National Liberation Front(FSLN))developed a close relationship. When the Sandinistas
defeated Somoza and his National Guard in 1979, this relationship between the two
nations became more crucial. Following the exile of the remaining members of the
National Guard to Honduras, Cuba worked furiously to help the struggling nation move
forward after years of internal warfare.
An analogous rejection of perceived “Yankee imperialism” in Latin America also
helped to forge the relationship between Cuba and Nicaragua. An oft-mentioned subject
in many of Castro’s speeches including his “Declaration of Havana,” Nicaraguan
revolutionary rhetoric contained this same theme. Shortly after the conclusion of the 1979
Nicaraguan Revolution, Daniel Ortega, one of the primary leaders of the FSLN, gave a
speech in Havana and commended both the leadership and people of Cuba for freeing
themselves from imperialist control as well as serving as inspiration for others in the
region.'^ Although Cuban and Nicaraguan leaders referred to incidents unique to each
country’s history, their descriptions of these events in revolutionary rhetoric reflected a
strong anti-imperialist sentiment. Castro and Ortega justified revolutions in both
countries as rejections of American imperialism in addition to reactions to internal issues
of political corruption and economic inequality.'*
The Cuban government strongly supported revolutionary movements in countries
across the hemisphere in the first ten years following the ousting of Fulgencio Batista in

■ Robert A. Pastor, Condemned to Repetition: The United States and Nicaragua,(Princeton: Princeton
University Press. 1987), 13.
^ Tomas Borges. Carlos Fonesca, Daniel Ortega. Humberto Ortega, and Jaime Wheelock, Sandinistas
Spea,. Edited by Bruce Marcus,(New York: Pathfinder Press, 1982). 44.
Borges, Fonesca, Ortega, Ortega, Wheelock 26-29.
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1959. Cuba provided material support as well as diplomatic or advisory assistance to a
number of countries across Latin America. Several factors contributed to Castro’s
willingness to provide support to other revolutionary movements. According to Gary
Prevost, these factors included Castro’s staunch opposition to what he perceived as the
imperialistic actions of the United States against Cuba as well as his understanding of the
Cuban Revolution within an international context.^
Castro’s conceptualization of the Cuban Revolution within an international
context led him to seek relationships with a variety of revolutionary leaders. Nicaragua’s
Sandinista National Liberation Front(FSLN)represented one of the closest and most
enduring. The relationship between Cuba and the FSLN in Nicaragua began when one of
the founders of the FSLN, Carlos Fonseca, traveled to Cuba in 1959 to meet with Ernesto
(Che) Guevara.^ Prior to Fonseca’s visit, the guerilla struggle in the Sierra Maestra
inspired many in Nicaragua, and the Cuban Revolution in 1959 served as further
inspiration for those hoping to unseat Somoza from power in their country.^ Interaction
between the Cuban government and members of the FSLN continued throughout the
sixties, even after the shift in Cuban policy in 1968 to focus on internal issues.
After 1968, Cuba maintained its connection to the FSLN despite its internal focus
and served as a sanctuary for many FSLN leaders targeted by Somoza and his National
Guard as the situation in Nicaragua continued to worsen, following the 1972 earthquake.
Many in Cuba did not believe that a revolutionary movement in Nicaragua would be

^ Gary Prevosl, “Cuba and Nicaragua: A Special Relationship?” Latin American Perspectives 17 (1990):
121.
^ Prevost 122.
’ Prevost 122.
® Borges. Fonesca, Ortega, Ortega, Wheelock, 32-33, 54.
Prevost 123.
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Gary Prevost, “Cuba and Nicaragua: A Special Relationship?" Latin American Perspectives 17 (1990):
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^ Prevost 122.
^ Borges, Fonesca, Ortega, Ortega, Wheelock, 32-.'^3, 54.
Prevost 123.
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successful. Nonetheless, the FSLN-led offensive against the National Guard in September
of 1978 shifted the Cuban view toward Nicaragua. Following the offensive, Cuba
actively worked to ensure success for their Nicaraguan allies.'^ Initially, Cuba provided
limited assistance to their Nicaraguan allies. Aside from Castro’s role in uniting the
various factions within the FSLN in 1979, Cuba remained relatively neutral until after the
eventual triumph of the Sandinistas in August 1979.
With the success of the Sandinistas over the National Guard and the subsequent
removal of Somoza from power, the relationship between Cuba and Sandinista-led
Nicaragua grew even closer as Cuba became an integral part of Nicaragua’s diversified
dependency plan for development. Prevost asserts that Cuban naturally gravitated toward
Nicaragua as the triumph of the Sandinistas led Castro as well as other Cuban leaders to
11

believe that “their revolutionary hopes for Latin America still had limited possibilities.
In a speech given on July 26, 1979, to commemorate the anniversary of the 1953
Moncada attack, Castro pledged Cuba’s assistance to the new, Sandinista government.
12

Castro called its Cuba’s “fraternal duty to help Nicaragua.
Despite their close relationship to the Cuban government, Sandinista leaders in
Nicaragua made a concerted effort to avoid aligning too closely with their Caribbean ally
to allay suspicions in other countries, particularly the decidedly anti-Cuba United States.
Sandinista leaders like Daniel Ortega emphasized the internal nature of the struggle in
Nicaragua and refuted claims of intervention from a host of Latin American nations.

Prevost 124; Michael H. Erisman. Cuba's International Relation: The Anatomy ofa NationalisticForeign Policy,(Boulder: Westview, 1985): 89.
" Prevosl 130.
'■ George Black and John Bevan. The loss offear: education in Nicaragua before and after the revolution.
(Nicaragua Solidarity Campaign: World University Service, 1980). 45.
5

particularly Cuba.^'^ Straddling a “narrow path between their dreams and their
capabilities,” leaders in the newly established Nicaraguan government sought to
ingratiate themselves to many countries, of which Cuba remained a most vociferous
14

proponent of the Sandinista regime.

In addition to providing financial assistance as part of Nicaragua’s “diversified
dependency” plan, Cuba also played a diplomatic role in developing trade agreements
between Nicaragua and the Soviet Union, nations in Western Europe, and other countries
in Latin America. Directly following the Nicaraguan Revolution, the Cuban government
provided assistance to educational, medicine and health, and construction/ infrastructure
development initiatives in Nicaragua. 1,200 Cuban primary teachers, technicians and
advisors helped organize rural education and worked on agrarian reform measures. Cuban
physicians also provided additional support once Nicaragua began its Literacy Crusade in
15

the following year.
Although Cuba offered some form of assistance to many facets of Nicaraguan life
under the newly established Sandinista government, Cuba concentrated its efforts in
Nicaragua on education. In addition to eventually providing around 2,000 teachers to the
nascent government, Cuba offered pedagogical preparation for Nicaraguan teachers.
Cuba’s educational assistance also included technical training for Nicaraguan workers in
Cuba, donations of books, and the creation of exchange programs for faculty and students
at Cuban and Nicaraguan universities. Cuban assistance proved particularly crucial both
during the planning and later implementation of Nicaragua’s National Literacy Crusade.

Tomas Borges. Carlos Fonesca, Daniel Ortega, Humberto Ortega, and Jaime Wheelock 44-45.
Pastor 214.
Black and Bevan 44-45.
Prevost 126-7.
6

Cuban advisors and participants provided “technical assistance and advice” based on
17

their knowledge and experienced gained during the 1961 Cuban campaign.
Why Education?
The revolutionary governments in Cuba and Nicaragua embarked on a series of
political, social, and cultural reforms after taking power from Batista and Somoza
respectively. These endeavors included health initiatives and the expansion of political
freedoms, but what made Cuba and Nicaragua’s focus on education through massive,
nationwide literacy campaigns so notable? The efficiency and dedication of both
countries toward literacy programs deserves recognition for both accomplishing so much
in such little time, and the longevity of the results— especially in considering the Cuban
model. As the quality of education in Latin America “varie[d] from the moderately good
to the lamentable,” another feature that warrants attention is the degree of success given
the circumstances of public education in each of the countries prior to the start of each
18

literacy initiative.
Each of the revolutionary government’s focus on education and more specifically
universal literacy highlighted the importance of this facet of improvement as a key to
increasing the standard of living in both countries. Cuban and Nicaraguan leaders
understood and promoted the notion that an illiterate populace preempted the ability of
any ruling body to substantially affect or improve the state of the country or its
inhabitants’ lives. In developing the programs in each country, Cuban and Nicaraguan
leaders also considered the political expediency in creating a newly literate populace to
generate support for their other revolutionary programs. Therefore, both countries created

Prevosl 126.
Black and Bevan 15.
7

plans with decidedly political messages to promote not just a sense of national pride but
more specifically a pride focused on the revolutionary groups’ contributions to the
countries. Similarly motivated by a desire to generate political support in addition to
lowering illiteracy, organizers in Cuba and Nicaragua also structured their respective
literacy programs analogously, breaking from the more traditional teaching methods
utilized in other literacy programs, especially those supported by UNESCO. The eventual
implementation of the programs in 1961 and 1980 also mirrored one another with young
people leading the charge into the battle against illiteracy.
Despite the similar development, structure, and implementation of literacy
programs in Cuba and Nicaragua, the 1961 National Literacy Campaign yielded more
substantive results with regard to lowering levels of illiteracy within the country. In 1961,
the Cuba government reported a reduction in illiteracy across the country from 25% to
around 3.9%. Some towns and provinces claimed to have eliminated illiteracy entirely.
On November 5, 1961, Melena del Sur, a village in Havana Province, became the first
area in Cuba to declare itself a “Territorio libre de analfabetismo” (illiteracy-free
territory), and other towns and provinces followed until the official end of the Campaign
19

in 1961. Nicaragua reported a reduction from 50.3% to 12.9% following its program in
1980. Cutting the rate of illiteracy by over half reflects a great deal of success albeit not
as numerically significant as Cuba’s. The actions taken in subsequent years, however,
served to differentiate between the programs as Cuba not only managed to maintain the
gains made during its initial program but continued to make headway in improving its
overall educational system, reducing illiteracy to its current level of 2%- one of the

Jonathan Kozol. Children of the Revolution: A Yankee Teacher in the Cuban School,(New York:
Delacorte Press. 1978), 53.
8

lowest in the world. Although initially successful, Nicaragua failed to maintain its
original inroads toward eliminating illiteracy, with approximately 26% of the Nicaraguan
20

people currently classified as illiterate.
But with such similar programs, the difference in results raises the question: why?
To address this, one must consider how the numerous internal as well as external
variables affected the programs both positively and negatively to explain the
incongruencies in the results of the programs. Naturally, these variables altered both the
short-term effectiveness as well as the long-term success of the initial programs.
Internally, infrastructure most significantly affected each program, and the success of
efforts in Cuba and Nicaragua depended heavily existence and continued reinvestment in
infrastructure projects. Investments in infrastructure included building and maintaining
roads, primary and secondary schools, and availability of electricity. Additionally, the
timing of the campaign, the financial state of the country at the outset and after the
campaign, linguistic differences, and the role of the Catholic Church as well as other
religious organizations within the country affected each country’s program, in
conjunction with the external variables that also influenced each initiative.
Significant external forces exerted influence on each country’s attempt to address
illiteracy. The Cold War and more specifically the shift in the United States’ relationship
with each country most heavily impacted the effectiveness of the work done during Cuba
and Nicaragua’s respective literacy programs. Because the relationship between each
country and the United States affected each program, the shift in US policy at the outset
of the 1980s proved extremely detrimental to the Nicaraguan program and the country’s

20

Figures for literacy retrieved from the CIA’s World Fact Book
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ability to sustain the gains made during its 1980 National Literacy Crusade. Educational
and financial assistance from outside nations and other non-governmental organizations
as well as pedagogical input from outside groups or individuals also had an impact on the
literacy programs in Cuba and Nicaragua.

Historiographical .Analysis

Implemented at the outset of a Latin American revolutionary governments’ ruling
tenure, both the 1961 Cuban Literacy Campaign and the 1980 National Literacy Crusade
in Nicaragua sought to reduce rates of illiteracy. Targeting primarily rural populations,
volunteers traversed Cuba and Nicaragua teaching their countrymen basic reading and
writing skills. Revolutionary leaders in both Cuba and Nicaragua intended to rest their
ambitious sets of social reforms upon the base of successful literacy programs. By
reaching populations previously underserved or entirely ignored by former governments,
Castro and the Sandinistas hoped their respective literacy programs would draw in a wide
range of supporters for their revolutionary agendas. However, the rationale behind
implementing nationwide literacy programs in Cuba and Nicaragua extends beyond
politics. Both ruling groups realized the vital need for a literate populace to spur
economic development in each of the woefully underdeveloped nations.
Although a poignant point in both the Cuban and Nicaraguan historical narratives,
few scholars have researched these countries’ programs in-depth. Given the lack of
serious scholarship toward the Cuban or the Nicaraguan efforts to reduce illiteracy, a
great deal remains to be studied to better understand the interworking of both programs
and how each country managed to attain the level of success it did considering its
10

particular implementation. The most accessible literature currently available concerning
the 1961 Cuban Campaign and 1980 Nicaraguan Crusade exists in the form of personal
memoirs or journals kept by participants in both the Cuban and Nicaraguan literacy
programs."^ These personal narratives, particularly those Although personal memoirs
written by program participants in Cuba and Nicaragua provide insight into the
experiences shared by those working in both countries as well as invaluable
ethnographic, qualitative information about the two programs, there remains a need for
more quantitative analyses of each program to better understand the successes as well as
the shortcomings of the initiatives.
A preeminent scholar in modern Cuban history, Louis A. Perez s Essays on
Cuban History: Historiography and Research serves as an excellent starting point from
which to search for further information about this country, and his Cuba: Between
Reform and Revolution provides more in-depth information concerning 20 century
Cuba.- Written from a more journalistic perspective, some have criticized Richard Gott’s
Cuba: A New History for its sympathies toward the revolution and particularly Castro s
revolutionary aims.

Gott’s supposed sympathies for revolutionary measures in Cuba

stem from the social and cultural focus of his work in that Gott argues that the revolution
drastically altered the social interactions and relationships of most Cubans, something
substantiated by the experience of the 1961 Literacy Crusade.

Valerie Miller, Between Struggle and Hope: The Nicaraguan Literacy Crusade,(Westview, 1985);
Jonathan Kozol; Sheryl Hirshon and Judy Butler, And Also Teach Them to Read,(Westport: Lawrence Hill
& Company, 1983).
“● Louis A. Perez, Jr., Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution, (New York: Oxford University Press); Louis
A. Perez. Jr., Essays on Cuban Historw Historiography and Research, (Gainesville: University Press of
Florida, 1995).
’
Richard Gott, Cuba: A New History, New Haven: Yale University Press. 2004.
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Thomas Walker’s revised edition survey of modem Nicaraguan history provides a
readable and concise overview of

century Nicaraguan history.""^ The updated version

of Walker’s Nicaraguan narrative heavily emphasizes the continued involvement of the
United States in the country’s most recent history. As one of the first to publish about the
Sandinista Revolution, Walker portrays the Sandinistas relatively sympathetically, and
asserts that outside influence from the United States most detrimentally affected the
ruling groups’ efforts. Although Walker’s placing of blame on the actions of the United
States is not wholly unfounded, his downplaying or discounting of internal issues like the
political rifts between the FSLN and others like Violeta Barrios Chamorro and the UNO
as well as within the party itself introduces a certain level of bias into his work. Donald
Hodges, although still critical of the actions of the United States toward Nicaragua,
discusses at greater length the internal issues destabilizing both the FSLN and the country
of Nicaragua as a whole, and in a way, works to balance Walker’s externally focused
Nicaraguan narrative."'^
Donald Hodges and Shirley Christian, take relatively oppositional views when
assessing the political motivations driving the Sandinistas social reform. Writing from a
more politically conservative perspective, Christian writes rather disparagingly of
Sandinista leadership and the FSLN’s political motivations in implementing their various
social reform efforts.

26

Whereas Christian asserts the Sandinistas intended to lead the

country in a manner highly analogous to the totalitarian stmcture pursued by Castro,
Hodges refutes this claim, highlighting the FSLN’s continued efforts to ingratiate

24

Thomas Walker, Living in the Shadow ofthe Eagle, Fourth Ed.,(Boulder: Weslview Press, 2003).
Donald Hodges, Intellectual Foundations ofthe Nicaraguan Revolution: Thomas Walker. Living in the
Shadow ofthe Eagle, Fourth Ed.,(Boulder: Westview Press, 2003).
26
Shirley Christian, Nicaragua: Revolution in the Family, with new material on the Contra
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themselves to a number of politically disparate countries and organizations. Hodges’
presentation of the Nicaraguan ruling party starkly contrasts Christian’s portrayal of the
Sandinistas as a group heavily dependent on outside influence. Hodges assigns the
Sandinistas a greater degree of political autonomy, and although they cooperated and
communicated with Soviet bloc nations as well as Cuba, Hodges argues they maintained
a distinct degree of ideological independence.
Jonathan Kozol and Theodore MacDonald provide differing although not
oppositional views of the Cuban educational program prior to and following the 1961
Campaign. Written as more of an ethnographic study, Kozol examined the lives of former
literacy workers and participants in the Cuban Campaign,focusing on the program from a
more ethnographic or individual-driven perspective.^^ MacDonald, on the other hand,
emphasizes the role of the Cuban state in the successful carrying out of the campaign and
particularly in implementing the various follow up programs. Given the extremely
significant role of the Cuban state securing the success of its literacy campaign through
substantial, continued investments in education, MacDonald’s institutionally focused
survey of Cuban education more accurately reflects program’s structure and ability to
succeed. Both Marvin Leiner and Sheryl Lutjens echo MacDonald’s institutionally driven
view of the program in their articles focused on more specific aspects of the Cuban
29

program.

27

Jonathan Kozol, Children ofthe Revolution: A Yankee Teacher in the Cuban Schools,(New York:
Delacorte Press, 1978).
28
Theodore MacDonald, Making a New People: Education in Revolutionary Cuba,(Vancouver: New Star
Books, 1985).
29
Marvin Leiner, “The 1961 National Cuban Literacy Campaign,” in National Literacy Campaigns:
Historical and Comparative Perspectives, ed. by Robert F. Amove and Harvey J. Graff. 17.'^-196.(New
York: Plenum Press. 1987); Sheryl L. Lutjens. “Women. Education, and the State in Revolutionary Cuba.”
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Kozol’s approach is very similar to the later narratives penned by Valerie Miller
and Sheryl Hirshon and Judy Butler about the Nicaraguan Crusade in 1980. Miller and
Hirshon and Butler attribute success in the Nicaraguan Crusade to the volunteers
participating in the campaign itself rather than a state or political entity such as the
30

FSLN.

As the Nicaraguan government played a much smaller role in funding and

organizing the campaign, relying almost entirely on outside funding and individual or
group support, these “ground up” presentations of the Nicaraguan Crusade offer a more
accurate depiction of the Crusade in trying to better understand its success.
George Black and John Bevan’s investigation of the Nicaraguan educational
system just prior to and after the revolution provides data crucial to a better
understanding of the internal variables affecting the Nicaraguan effort.'^’ Although not
staunchly pro-FSLN, Black and Bevan’s report places a considerable amount of blame on
the Somoza regime for the deplorable state of education in Nicaragua at the time of the
Nicaraguan Revolution. In placing so much blame on the Somoza regime. Black and
Bevan emphasize the considerable impediments placed before the Sandinistas,
particularly those related to institutional shortcomings resulting from Somoza’s tenure as
head of Nicaragua.
Speeches given by Fidel Castro as well as influential members of the FSLN
provide the rationale behind the development of the campaigns and explain the

in Latin American Education: Comparative Perspectives, Edited by Carlos Alberto Torres and Adriana
Puiggros.(Boulder: Westview Press, 1997): 289-319.
Valerie Miller, Between Struggle and Hope: The Nicaraguan Literacy Crusade,(Boulder: Westview,
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importance of the literacy programs within a revolutionary context.

Literacy remains a

central theme in many of the speeches and writings of these leaders, and the documents
also evidence both ruling groups’ intention to use the literacy movements in the
development of the “new man,” a topic discussed to a greater extent both by Cuban
33

Revolutionary Ernesto “Che” Guevara as well as French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre.
These sources, particularly the emphasis on the emergence of a post-revolutionary “new
man,” evidence the Marxist leanings of the leaders in both countries. An understandable
amount of bias characterizes each of these documents and revolutionary leaders used
these speeches and writings as propaganda to promote their respective ruling groups.
Despite their partiality, they remain essential as they provide an understanding of the
public portrayal of each literacy program by the Cuban and Nicaraguan governments, and
to some extent,justify the appeal and attractive presentation of each program to potential
volunteers or participants. Fred Judson’s “Sandinista Revolutionary Morale offers a
more objective view of Sandinista rhetoric in particular, making it an invaluable source in
34

evaluating statements made by leaders of the FSLN.
Reports published by UNESCO and other researchers working in the Cuban and
Nicaraguan Ministry of Education provide invaluable statistical data regarding the
campaigns and the subsequent actions taken by each country following the close of the
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initial programs.

Although Ana Lorenzo’s study of Cuba and Ulrike Hanemann reports

on Nicaragua provide objective analytical data regarding both programs, the report
authored in Cuba and later published by UNESCO primarily concerning the countryside
carries a distinct ideological slant favoring the Cuban government’s actions to address
illiteracy.Working within the Nicaraguan Ministry of Education, Juan B. Arrien’s
assessment of educational endeavors undertaken in Nicaragua during the 1980s provides
a more objective view of the country’s efforts, unlike the Cuban report, despite the
heavily charged political atmosphere in which Arrien published his report. Sympathetic
views toward the ruling governments characterized the internal reports published by
Cuba and Nicaragua, but the Lorenzo and Hanemann reports authored for UNESCO
supplement and validate the figures presented in the more biased internal reports.
Understanding the United States’ foreign policy during the Cold Was is
particularly crucial as this policy directly affected both Cuba and Nicaragua’s abilities to
carry out their literacy or subsequent follow-up educational measures. John Lewis Gaddis
and John Hammond’s assessments of security policy during the Cold War provide an
overview of American foreign policy during the time in which Cuba and Nicaragua
38

conducted their programs. Classified as a “post-revisionist,” Gaddis’s writing
concerning the Cold War does take into account the restrictions on US policy makers
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during this period due to pressing domestic concerns. With regard to Latin America,
however, Gaddis downplays the impact of foreign policy on the region as well as the
direct involvement of the United States in Latin America during this period. Hammond’s
work, like Gaddis, focuses on the US-origins of Cold War policy and devotes little space
to a discussion about the implementation or outcomes of these policy initiatives in other
countries, specifically Latin America. Consequently, the US-centric focus of both Gaddis
and Hammond limits the utility of these works in this research, although they did give
insight and information about the policies themselves.
Not unlike Thomas Walker’s Nicaraguan historical narrative, Jesus Arboleya’s
investigation of the various counterrevolutionary forces at work within Cuba assigns a
great deal of responsibility to the United States for the various anti-Castro efforts
formulated or carried out in Cuba in the last half century.'^^ With regard to internal
dissent, Castro effectively eliminated or suppressed most internal sources of dissent
within the country, which justifies Arboleya’s downplaying of the role of these groups or
individuals. The same, however, is not true for Nicaragua as the Sandinistas contended
with considerable internal and external sources of dissent, something little mentioned in
Walker’s narrative. Michael Erisman’s Cuba's International Relations: The Anatomy ofa
Nationalistic Foreign Policy gives a basic understanding of the nationalistic focus and
aims that have traditionally driven Cuban foreign policy."^® The nationalistic tendencies of
Cuba are especially crucial to understanding this period as these motivations not only
encouraged Cuban leaders to develop a literacy program initially, but they greatly
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influenced the materials used in the program and inspired many to participate as
volunteers. Edited by Cole Blasier and Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Cuba in the World provides
41

perhaps the most interesting perspective regarding Cuba’s international relations.
Gary Prevost's article, “Cuba and Nicaragua: A Special Relationship?” provides
both a concise overview of the relationship between the two countries and introduces the
ideas central to Sandinista foreign policy, most notably their “diversified dependency”
plan."^“ Robert Pastor's Condemned to Repetition: The United States and Nicaragua
offers a more in-depth understanding of Nicaraguan foreign policy, although ,like
Walker and George and Bevan, considers the United States or Somoza culpable for most
of the difficulties the Sandinistas encountered in establishing and maintaining of ties with
Other countries to
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Pastor, however, provides a more expansive view of Nicaraguan

policy issues by exploring the various political factions within Nicaragua openly working
against the Sandinistas and contradicting or preempting the work of the FSLN from
within the party itself
The pedagogical implications of both the Cuban and Nicaraguan literacy
programs merit considerable attention as the programs in each country not only altered
teaching methods, studies, and foci in the countries themselves, but they influenced and
contributed to a greater shift in educational thought. Paulo Freire’s Pedagogy of the
Oppressed, published in 1965, best represents this larger shift in pedagogical method and
theory. Both programs substantiate the claims Freire asserts in the work, specifically his
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insistence on discussion-based learning and the use of “generative vocabulary” in adult
literacy programs.*^ Although some draw upon the relationship between Freire’s work
and the experiences in Cuba and Nicaragua, this research draws a more distinct
relationship between the theorist and these programs as he had first-hand experience in
both countries

in Cuba following the campaign and as an educational advisor in

Nicaragua in 1979—which to some degree influenced his views regarding educational
theory.
Freire’s Education for Critical Consciousness expounds upon the ideas he asserts
in his earlier Pedagogy ofthe Oppressed and explains in greater detail the political
necessity of literacy, particularly in countries in political transition."^^ Andrew
Kirkendall’s Paulo Freire & the Cold War Politics ofLiteracy reasserts this political
significance of the work of Paulo Freire himself and other revolutionary literacy
movements across Latin America and describes both Freire’s collaboration with the
World Council of Churches, a leading donor to the Nicaraguan program, and planners of
the Nicaraguan Literacy Crusade."*^ Both Freire and Kirkendall provide valid reasoning to
justify each revolutionary government’s want to pursue widespread literacy to promote
their political ends; however, Kirkendall’s examination of Nicaragua in particular does
highlight shortcomings of Sandinista leadership in conducting the campaign, a program
Freire himself remained entirely supportive.
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Given the limited amount of in-depth scholarship assessing either the 1961 Cuban
Campaign or the 1980 Nicaraguan Crusade, a considerable amount of work remains to
fully examine and therefore understand these programs. The addition of more literature
on both the Cuban and Nicaraguan programs not only contributes to a wider
understanding of each country’s historical narrative, but also explains how each program
impacted or influenced events internationally. This research attempts to provide a wider
perspective of the programs through a comparison of the experiences in Cuba and
Nicaragua and shed light onto how and why these programs succeeded or failed outside
of the structure and composition of the programs themselves.
Origins and Implementation of Programs
For Cuban and Nicaraguan leaders, a plenitude of factors, including promotion of
revolutionary ideals, reduction of income inequality, and the integration of members from
differing social or economic classes motivated the promotion of literacy. Leaders in both
Cuba and Nicaragua believed having a literate population was essential to the
implementation of subsequent revolutionary measures, programs, and initiatives. By
implementing literacy programs along with other social initiatives at the outset of their
revolutionary rises to power, Castro and the Sandinistas actively pursued means to attain
higher levels of literacy in their countries.
The idea of creating a “new man” motivated revolutionary leaders in Cuba and
Nicaragua, and they used it in their rhetoric promoting the literacy campaigns. The
French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre, a visitor to the island in 1960, commended Cuban
Revolutionary leaders in replying “to the material needs and the construction of the ‘new
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man”’ in their various endeavors— including the literacy campaign. Educational theorist
Paolo Freire also noted the importance of the “new man” to forward the cause for literacy
at the UNESCO conference in Persepolis, Iran, in 1975, as well as during his stint in
48

Nicaragua as an educational advisor.
Castro consistently presented widespread literacy and availability to free
education were two elements essential to the success of any successful revolutionary
movement in Cuba. Castro reflected his dedication to promoting the importance of
widespread literacy and access to free education in numerous speeches and published
writings. From speeches given as early as 1953, Castro and others within his cadre of
revolutionaries touted the importance of education as the “only basis for human dignity
49

and for the country’s social development.

While still stationed in the rural mountains

of eastern Cuba, Castro’s guerrilla forces released the “Manifesto of the Sierra Maestra.
The manifesto made the first specific mention of a literacy campaign to combat illiteracy
50

in the country,

Castro’s 1960 “First Declaration of Havana” promoted the importance of

free education for all Cuban children as a social right and a feature that would lead to the
51

liberation of the Cuban people from all forms of oppression.
Cuban and Nicaraguan leaders believed literacy would free their people from one
particular form of oppression: Yanqui Imperialism. In a speech to a delegation of the
United Nations in September of 1960, Castro not only announced the plan “to become the
first country in America... to say it does not have one single illiterate” though a country-
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wide literacy campaign, but also devoted considerable time in his speech detailing Cuba’s
experience beneath the weight of the imperialistic United States, particularly through the
provisions of the repressive Platt Amendment.^" Castro justified the Cuban Revolution as
one that liberated the Cuban people from the yoke of American imperialism. He further
implied that this same anti-imperialist sentiment influenced the development of the
literacy campaign to be conducted in the upcoming year. The Sandinistas, much like
Castro, focused on the restrictive nature of imperialism and its role in retarding growth in
the country. Throughout the rhetoric of the FSLN, Sandinista leaders referenced the
“imperialist” actions of the United States, and like Cuba,incorporated this same anti
53

imperialist thought into the message concerning the literacy campaign.
Much like Castro’s cadre, the rhetoric Sandinista leaders used in Nicaragua
emphasized the importance of education and literacy for all Nicaraguans. The Sandinistas
closely connected education and literacy with human dignity, albeit with a more
dogmatic slant than Cuba. To a great extent, leaders in Nicaragua portrayed Sandinismo
and Christianity as “two complementary aspects of Nicaraguan life,” and this message
certainly did not escape the Literacy Crusade.^"^ In addition to the religious slant of
rhetoric used to promote the literacy crusade, the Sandinistas also greatly emphasized the
political aspect of literacy. Drawing upon the Aristotelian definition of “politics” as
working toward greater good, Nicaraguan leader Fernando Cardenal emphasized the
central role of literacy and education in the pursuance of this “greater good” through
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politics.^*^ Though Nicaraguan leaders used decidedly more religious symbolism in their
ideas and platforms, the rhetoric used in Nicaragua to promote literacy incorporated
elements of nationalist ideals central to Cuban thought.
Although presumably carried out to address illiteracy in both countries, the
possible social and political implications certainly motivated the creation and
implementation of these plans. In the words of Cuban educator. Dr. Mier Febles, “the
goal of the campaign was always greater than to teach poor people how to read. The
dream was to enable those two portions of the population... to find a common bond, a
m56

common spirit, and a common goal.

Most alfabetizadores, advisors, and other

volunteers came from middle and upper class, urban backgrounds. Leaders in Cuba and
then in Nicaragua hoped literacy programs in sharing a common goal of reducing
illiteracy, would better integrate citizens from different economic and social backgrounds
into one social body that would be supportive of the revolutionary leaders while reducing
illiteracy.
Like the earlier Cuban campaign, organizers of the Nicaraguan National Literacy
Crusade hoped to maintain and gather new support for the Sandinista-led Nicaraguan
government through a country-wide literacy program. Nicaraguan leaders found the
country in a dire financial situation following the removal of Somoza. Economic
hardships prevented the new leaders from making any substantial efforts to immediately
raise the standard of living for impoverished Nicaraguans, the majority of whom
supported the FSLN.

The Sandinista-led government hoped the literacy campaign

Miller 25-26.
Ko7.o1 22.
*>7
Jan L. Flora. John McFadden, and Ruth Warner 46.

^6

23

would serve as a way to ensure continued support of the revolution as they attempted to
consolidate power across the country. Not only did the goal of preserving of existing
support drive Nicaraguan leaders to begin this intensive and country-wide effort to
combat illiteracy, but the possibility of gaining middle-class support for their government
through participation in the program as teachers or young brigadistas motivated the
Nicaraguan effort, as noted by Jan Flora, John McFadden and Ruth Warner in their study
58

of the crusade.

With a central place within the rhetoric of revolutionary forces in both Cuba and
Nicaragua, preparations for the implementation of these oft-mentioned literacy programs
began almost immediately after each revolutionary group took power. To prepare for
these programs, leaders in both countries studied previously designed or implemented
literacy programs, conducted census counts to locate illiterate populations as well as
developed the bureaucratic structure to organize and run each program.
Preparation for the Cuban Literacy Campaign began in full following
Comandante Castro’s address to the United Nations on September 26, 1960, although
some work related to the program had already been done on a small, experimental scale
before Castro’s official pronouncement.^^ Prior to the speech, members of the Literacy
and Basic Education Commission had hosted training programs for voluntary teachers on
techniques related to adult literacy. During these programs, the Commission examined
various methods used to teach people how to read including “the ideophonic method of
Ana Echegoyen, the normal words method of Maria L. Soler and the Laubach method.
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Although the commission initially decided to use a combination of the Echegoyen
and Laubach methods in the upcoming literacy campaign, they eventually abandoned
these methods at the behest of Dr. Raul Gutierrez, the Cuban Minister of Education, who
stated that “though technically good,[they] did not adapt themselves to the specific
motivation of the moment, of the country and of the struggle against illiteracy,

For the

campaign itself, Gutierrez and the commission instead developed a program that
62

implemented the “active and passive vocabulary of the Cuban farmer, " As these terms
had a greater social and cultural importance, the commission and especially Director
Gutierrez believed the use of what Brazilian pedagogical theorist Paolo Freire would later
deem “generative terms” would better motivate those learning to read. Freire contended
that to attain substantial gains through adult literacy programs organizers, teachers, and
volunteers should utilized words “generated” from the working vocabulary of the
participant in the program itself rather than the rote memorization promoted by earlier
methods

most notably the Laubach method. Although developed prior to Freire’s

promotion of “generative” words in adult literacy programs, the Cuban program closely
modeled his work in rural Brazil in 1964.^'^ Nicaragua also developed and utilized a
program similar to that of Cuba and Freire, with the added benefit of hosting advisors
from Cuba as well as Freire himself during the planning stages of their Literacy
64

Crusade.

In Nicaragua, preparation began in August 1979, following the appointment of
Father Fernando Cardenal as the National Coordinator. Cardenal alongside delegates
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Inaccurate in both countries, census records concerning rates of illiteracy did not
even exist for most of the country of Nicaragua. Therefore, both countries conducted a
volunteer-led census to collect data on illiteracy. In 1960 and 1961, Cubans— generally
members of groups such as the women's federation, trade unions, and the farmworkers
federation— traversed the country collecting information. Their records indicated that
979,000 illiterate people lived in Cuba, and the majority(67%)resided in rural areas.
70

especially in Oriente province.

In Nicaragua, volunteers carried out the census in a

remarkable two-week period in October 1979.^* After compiling the results from the
census, the information gathered confirmed the image of the country as one suffering
from “pronounced regional imbalances, reflecting the distorted model of economic
development under the dictatorship” with lower rates of illiteracy in more urbanized areas
like Managua or the Pacific coast belt (as low as 26.5%) and rural illiteracy rates reaching
72

85% in some of the most remote regions.

Although non-governmental entities like teachers unions or the church certainly
contributed to efforts to lower literacy, the Cuban and Nicaraguan governments initiated
and led their respective literacy programs. In Cuba, Dr. Raul Gutierrez directed the
Cuban Literacy Campaign indirectly as the Minister of Education and Director of the
National Literacy commission, known at the time as the National Literacy and Basic
73

Education Commission. Likewise in Nicaragua, the Literacy Crusade fell beneath the
direction a National Coordinating Committee within the Ministry of Education and under
the direct leadership of Father Fernando Cardenal, the brother of author and fellow priest
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Ernesto Cardenal.

With the centralization of efforts related to the development and

implementation of literacy programs below one singular institution within the
government, each program benefited from a relatively stable and unified chain of
command during the developmental stages. According to Valerie Miller, however, this
centralized bureaucratic structure proved to be cumbersome and therefore somewhat of
75

an impediment to workers once the work began in Nicaragua.
Cuba and Nicaragua utilized slightly different time frames to conduct their
respective literacy programs. Divided into three main parts, the Cuban Campaign began
on January 1, 1961, with the organization of the technical and organizational structure.
Cuban volunteer literacy workers trained for five weeks at Varadero, a former luxury
resort recently nationalized by Castro’s government. The second stage lasted from May
to September and consisted of a mass mobilization of the voluntary teaching forces to
begin their work against illiteracy, and the final stage lasted until mid-December
76

representing the “final push’’ of the year-long movement.
Organized on a much shorter time frame, the Nicaraguan National Literacy
Crusade began the year following the defeat of Somoza and the National Guard. The
Sandinista-led government designated 1980 as the “Year of Literacy,” and planning for
the program began almost immediately after the removal of Somoza. The planning period
lasted from August 1979, until the start of the program in March. During the first stage of
the Nicaraguan Crusade starting in March 1980, young volunteers underwent intensive
training in teaching methodology. The 1980 Crusade officially began on March 24, 1980,
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with the mass deployment of literacy workers into the various departments targeted by
the literacy program and ending on August 15th of the same year.
The successful implementation of a literacy campaign relied primarily on the
work of volunteers for teaching as well as advisory work in both countries. Leaders in
both countries realized the dire need for thousands of people to reach the widespread
illiterate populations, especially in rural areas, and extensive recruitment campaigns
immediately preceded each literacy movement. Although program organizers targeted
teachers to participate as instructors and educational advisors, students who had
completed at least a secondary level education made up the largest segment of the
population working as part of these campaigns. With a minimum age of 12 established
for the brigadistas, most of those participating in the Cuban and Nicaraguan effort fell
within the age range 12-24, with most aged 14-16.^^ To officially join the ranks of the
volunteer educators, teens in both countries submitted a permission signed by a parent or
guardian as evidence of their consent.
Naturally, many parents hesitated before automatically allowing their children to
leave for the literacy training programs, and students often found themselves having to
convince their parents. Some, like the Cuban brigadistas interviewed by Jonathan Kozol,
even threatened to forge the signature and leave anyway. Middle class parents, especially
those of teenage girls, represented the group most recalcitrant to grant permission to join
the campaign efforts. To sway the opinions of these suspicious parents, orgeinizers in

77

Leiner 1 77.
29

Cuba and Nicaragua organized volunteers in single sex groups, with males and females
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also residing in separate housing during the length of their training.
Shortages of qualified teachers most significantly contributed to the lack of
educational opportunities, especially in rural areas with the highest recorded levels of
illiteracy. Through the recruitment process, organizers in both countries hoped to lessen
the effects of this issue. In both countries, teachers, often raised and educated in urban
areas, demonstrated reluctance in leaving urban areas for rural teaching assignments. In
Cuba, for example, teachers— predominately women

often came from upper middle

class to wealthy families and frequently paid a surrogate to teach if assigned to a rural
79

area.

By recruiting younger segments of the population to work in the campaign,

planners in Cuba and Nicaragua hoped, at least to some degree, the novelty of leaving
home for the first time would sway many to not only join the program, but to agree to
serve in the traditionally underserved rural or mountainous regions.
After joining each program, literacy workers underwent an intensive, short-term
training that included learning teaching techniques as well as familiarization with the
teaching material, developed specially for each individual program. Training not only
helped to acclimate “teachers” who were by and large teenagers to their new positions,
but it also uniformly presented material and techniques. This uniformity in preparation
addressed one of the major problems common to Latin American public education
systems identified by George Black and John Bevan. In Black and Bevan’s examination
of the state of post-Somoza Nicaraguan education, they noted the detrimental impact of
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the lack of standardization, particularly in the training of primary school teachers.
Weekly sessions held either on Saturday or Sunday supplemented the uniform initial
training session that took place prior to the official start of the literacy programs in
Nicaragua and Cuba. These sessions allowed brigadistas to meet with regional advisors to
discuss progress of students, issues, introduce new teaching techniques, and discuss any
problems or difficulties encountered during the previous week.
Cuban literacy workers trained for an average of five weeks at Varadero learned
pedagogical techniques and how to adapt to living in “largely unelectrified and unfamiliar
rural areas.

81

As most Cuban brigadistas came from the more urbanized areas in or

around Havana, planners emphasized the importance of adaptation to the “campesino”
lifestyle. Giving Coleman lanterns to each of the Cuban volunteers evidenced this focus
on adaptation during training as brigadistas would likely have no other source of light for
82

their lessons after working all day with the family.
In Nicaragua, the training of literacy workers depended primarily on the success
of a multiplier effect. First, a group of eighty from the Patria Libre brigade received two
weeks of intensive pedagogical and practical training in teaching Spanish literacy. This
initial group then bore the responsibility of training another 560, and that group another
83

7,000.

Finally, the entire group of trained volunteers underwent a two-week program in

March prior to the official start of the program on March 24. As many of the Nicaraguan
volunteers came from the cities of Managua, Grenada, Leon, and along the Pacific coast.
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acclimation to living in the mountainous and relatively inhospitable countryside proved
essential to training for their Literacy Crusade like the earlier Cuban training program.
In addition to the more standardized teaching techniques promoted during the
training for literacy workers in Cuba and Nicaragua, the providing of standardized
teaching materials also contributed to the effectiveness of workers in both programs. In
Cuba, planners armed brigadistas with a teacher’s manual

Alfabeticemos(We learn
84

how to read) and a primer named Venceremos(We shall overcome).

The basis of the

Nicaraguan teaching materials included twenty-three lessons compiled in a book titled El
amanacer del pueblo (The Sunrise of the People) as part of the greater set of learning and
85

teaching materials titled the Cuademo de educacidn sandinista de lecto-escritura.
Developed just prior to the start of each program, the teaching materials used in both
Cuba and Nicaragua mirrored one another not only in structure but also in theme.
During the development of the primers, educators in both countries sought to
incorporate images, vocabulary, and situations common to those targeted by the
campaign in an effort to better engage them in the material and to overcome the
psychological barriers that are especially prevalent in adults who are illiterate.

In

addition to the incorporation of these “generative terms,” developers in both countries
incorporated a distinctly political message throughout the lessons included in the student
87

primer.

For example, Cuban organizers entitled the first lesson in the Cuban

Venceremos “OEA” and although intended to introduce vowel sounds, creators of the
program also meant for the lesson to share a political message.“OEA” stood for the
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Organizacion de Estados Americanos (Organization of American States- OAS), an
organization United States had recently excluded Cuba from in an effort to isolate the
country and thus weaken Castro's hold on power. Political elements also made their way
into the Nicaraguan primer with the first lesson, also focused on vowel sounds, centered
88

on Nicaraguan nationalist idol Augusto Sandino.
The structuring of the lessons proved to be one of the most successful elements of
both countries' literacy programs. Oral practice and discussion prompted by an image or
89

short story introduced new material and more structured written material then followed.
For both the Cuban and Nicaraguan literacy programs, the literacy worked showed the
illiterate student a photograph to elicit conversation, and thus begin oral practice in
90

Spanish before starting on the written portion of the lesson, In structuring lessons
around conversation between the literacy worker and the participant, organizers of both
programs hoped to avoid the “condescending manner” of teachers in many public schools
but at the same time provide a relatively structured learning environment given the brief
91

time frame of both literacy programs.

One of the most central elements to both programs consisted of the administration
of assessments to measure the progress of learners participating in the literacy programs
in Cuba and Nicaragua. Both countries utilized three assessments to measure the progress
of those participating in the literacy initiatives. In addition to the number of tests given.
the material on the exams in each country also reflected one another in terms of theme as
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the tests, like the primers themselves, often had a decidedly political slant or socio¬
cultural significance specific to the country.
Before starting their lessons with a new student, Cuban literacy workers filled out
a questionnaire with the new, non-literate pupil about the person’s educational
background and work or career information to get a better understanding of the learner’s
92

current abilities with regard to reading and writing, Throughout the time with learners.
literacy workers administered three tests to measure progress, with the final test
administered after the completion of the primer. By the completion of the Cuban
program, students composed a letter to Castro detailing their recently attained literate
state.

Throughout the five months of the National Literacy Crusade, volunteers also
kept records to track the progress of those involved in the program. These records not
only included journal entries kept by brigadistas or alfabetizadores themselves about their
experiences but also three tests administered to those involved in the program to mark
their progress. Given at the outset of the program, the first test measured the initial skill
level of the individual participating in the literacy program. It began with an exercise that
required the participant to draw a straight line, followed by some reading and writing
exercises, and finally a section to test reading comprehension.^^ After finishing half of the
primer, the participant took a second test to assess progress and identify any individual
study needs. At the conclusion of the program, the participant took the third and final
exam under the guidance of a technical advisor to assess the participant’s degree of
literacy. The final exam included sections testing reading, writing and comprehension
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skills through reading a short passage aloud, composing a short essay, writing his or her
94

name, and answering questions related to a reading.
The close of the Cuban and Nicaraguan literacy campaigns revealed notable.
positive results of each country's efforts. In Cuba, illiteracy fell from a reported 23.9% to
95

approximately 3%.

Nicaragua's intensive, five-month efforts resulted in a reduction of
96

illiteracy from 50.3% to 12.9%.

Even though some contest the specific figures

presented by both countries regarding illiteracy both prior to and following each literacy
initiative, each program did result in a significant reduction of Spanish-language illiteracy
across both countries, particularly in the traditionally-underserved mral areas.
In Cuba, members of the National Literacy Commission as well as others within
the Cuban government viewed the Literacy Campaign of 1961 as a springboard for
further educational developments.^^ Entitled the Seguimiento (Follow-Up), Cuban leaders
developed this program as a way to ensure the preservation of the gains made during the
1961 Literacy Campaign, and concede that the achievements of that initial effort “would
have been of lasting value, in purely pedagogic terms, had it not been for the Follow98

Up.
Nicaragua, too, viewed the Literacy Crusade as the crucial first step toward
achieving the other educational goals listed within the “Historic Program of the FSLN,” a
document published initially in 1969 and reprinted in June 1981 by the Department of
Propaganda and Political Education.^^ Following the first push to eliminate Spanish
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illiteracy during the five-month National Literacy Crusade, the National Coordinating
Committee embarked on a transitional program to shift from the literacy program to
permanent courses in adult education to preserve gains attained during the campaign. The
implementation of follow-up programs in Nicaragua included an added benefit as it
allowed many former students to serve as regional “coordinators” to help others practice
100

skills they themselves mastered during the crusade itself,

In addition to the transitional

program, the Coordinating Committee also organized efforts to address illiteracy in other
101

languages spoken in Nicaragua, primarily English.
Although leaders in Cuba and Nicaragua considered literacy a crucial element not
only to their political success but also the economic and social success of the people in
both countries, neither group considered its short-term literacy initiative as independent
from a wider program dedicated to continued educational advancement. Following the
conclusion of their respective programs, leaders in each country embarked on subsequent
measures to ensure and to preserve the gains made during the nationwide literacy
programs. The pursuit and implementation of these measures varied considerably from
Cuba to Nicaragua, and several internal as well as external factors greatly affected the
eventual results of the programs conducted in each country to eradicate illiteracy.
Internal Variables
Despite the similarities in structure and implementation of the literacy programs
in Cuba and Nicaragua, several internal variables impacted the efficacy of the work done
by literacy volunteers in each country. As continuing education proved to be the key to
sustaining gains made during each campaign, officials in Cuba and Nicaragua attempted
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to bridge the gap between the short-term literacy campaign and a long-term plan to
eliminate or greatly reduce illiteracy. Several internal variables affected the feasibility of
these efforts, with the most influential of these variables being infrastructure. Roads,
schools, and the availability of running water and electricity, influenced each program the
most. The financial state of each country both prior to and during the carrying out of each
program, the timing of the programs, linguistic concerns addressed in Nicaragua, the role
of religion or religious organizations, as well as the personalistic appeal of leaders
102

supporting the Cuban program also differed between programs in Cuba and Nicaragua.
Timing of the literacy programs in the revolutionary context
Occurring nearly two years after the 1959 overthrow of Batista, 1961 Cuban
Literacy Campaign enjoyed certain benefits due to the timing of the endeavor. During
those two years, many opponents to Castro and his socialist-structured government left
the island and chose to make the ninety mile trip to the United States. After the failed
invasion at the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban government imprisoned those who remained on
the island in opposition to Castro and the government, and governmental dissidents
continued to flee the island. Cuba’s success at the Bay of Pigs reinvigorated the
revolutionary spirit of Castro’s supporters and eliminated dissenters who could have
posed a threat to those planning, volunteering, or participating in the Literacy Campaign.
The later start of the Cuban program also afforded Castro and others working in the
government greater time to acclimate themselves to the functioning of the government
itself.

'^"By timing. 1 am referring to the distance in time from each country’s revolution to the beginning of their
literacy program.
37

The timing of the 1980 Nicaraguan Literacy Crusade offered some benefits, but
certainly some disadvantages as well. Because planners began organizing the Nicaraguan
literacy program almost immediately after the defeat of Somoza and the National Guard,
the revolutionary fervor reverberating throughout the country benefitted organizers and
volunteers in the Nicaraguan Crusade. Young Nicaraguans, many of whom had
participated in the revolution itself. This excitement proved to be instrumental in the
recruiting of young Nicaraguans to work for the program as many had participated in the
revolution itself and hoped to keep its spirit alive through participation in the Crusade.
The early start, however, did disadvantage the Nicaraguan organizers to some extent
though as inexperience in governing and haste to begin the program led to many issues
noted by observers or participants in the program. Also, in using such an abbreviated time
frame, the Sandinistas did not consolidate power politically, leaving themselves
vulnerable to attacks from dissent groups still actively working within the country.
The relationship between geography and infrastructure
The geographic and climactic makeup of each country most influenced the
availability or existence of infrastructure in Cuba and Nicaragua. With the majority of
illiterate populations residing in the rural areas of both countries, Nicaraguan and Cuban
brigadistas endured precarious and unwelcoming weather conditions to reach their
assigned destinations. Geographic features did serve, to some degree, as a hindrance to
literacy workers’ efforts. The timing of the Cuban and Nicaraguan campaigns and the
adaptive efforts of the workers themselves to better acclimate to conditions lessened the
negative impact of geography on each program. Though the geographic and climactic
makeup of each country hindered the work of literacy workers, the existence or workable
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slate of infrastructure in the countries prior to the start of the programs more greatly
impacted the efforts of those working in Cuba and Nicaragua.

Cuba
Situated within the mild waters of the Caribbean Ocean, the island nation of Cuba
is located approximately ninety miles south of the Florida peninsula. Cuba’s geographical
location motivated many colonial powers and later the United States to seek to control
this crucial landmass. A Spanish colony until 1898, the Spanish crown used the island
103

colony as a gatekeeper for regional trade.

One major chain of mountains (the Sierra

Maestra) covers the eastern half of this tropical island. Aside from this grouping of
mountains, the topographical layout of Cuba consists primarily of rolling hills and coastal
plain regions near the shorelines. As the Caribbean's gatekeeper, Cuba remains
susceptible to hurricanes and tropical storms, but it does not have to contend with the
earthquakes or volcanoes that frequently affect Nicaragua.
Once considered the “Crown Jewel of the Caribbean,” Spain counted Cuba as its
most profitable colony. As such, Spanish colonials constructed a relatively extensive set
of roadways on the island. Although roads in rural areas ranged from slight disrepair to
dirt paths, cities like Havana enjoyed well-paved and planned street systems for the most
part. The brevity and less violent nature of the Cuban Revolution preserved much of the
infrastructure in existence under Batista, a stark contrast to the much more destructive
Nicaraguan Revolution.
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A complete lack of schools in rural areas confined the availability of primary and
104

secondary schooling to those residing in urbanized areas before the revolution in Cuba.
Few educational facilities existed outside of expensive boarding schools in rural Cuba.
Therefore, Cubans living in rural areas had extremely limited educational opportunities.
In addition to a general lack of educational facilities, the cost of attendance also
prevented many Cubans from attaining any amount of education, as private schools in
rural regions were relatively costly. If a rural school actually existed, under-trained or
under-educated teachers often filled the classrooms. Absenteeism among teachers
plagued most rural schools, since teachers assigned to rural postings frequently paid less„105

educated surrogates to teach in their places while “the teacher holidayed in Miami.
The Cuban government's massive reinvestment in infrastructure certainly
benefited the Cuban program both during the campaign and in subsequent years,
particularly regarding the building of schools. In 1961, the Cuban government
constructed over 3000 schools, around 300,000 Cuban children attended school for the
106

first time, and the pool of available, trained educators expanded by about 7000.
Throughout the program and after the official conclusion of the Cuban Literacy
Campaign, the Cuban government rebuilt roads and schools across the country, allowing
for exponential expansion in the availability of free primary, secondary, and university
education.
Cuban schools benefited government initiatives to eliminate illiteracy in
providing a space both to conduct the Seguimiento and to introduce new, more
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technically focused teaching materials as part of a larger change in Cuban education. The
shift in education quickly led to a shift in the professional demographics of the island.
Prior to the revolution and subsequent literacy campaign,“there was no systematic or
conscious link between national economic or social needs and the work of the
..107

university.

In designing the program and the subsequent measures comprising the

Segiiimiento. Cuban leaders noted the need for more technically trained workers to attain
any degree of sustainable economic growth and designed the program and the new
108

educational institutions to reflect this reality.
The positive effect of the cult of personality surrounding Cuban leaders such as
Fidel Castro and Ernesto “Che” Guevara distinguished the Cuban experience from
previous and subsequent literacy programs. Even from the Moncada attacks in 1953,
Cubans held Castro in high regard and considered him “the outstanding figure of his
109

generation.

After assuming power in 1959, Castro made himself a “ubiquitous

presence” through Cuba’s radio and television systems and in-person by delivering
1 10

speeches nearly constantly.

Within months, Cubans, brimming with revolutionary

fervor began clamoring for change to the political, social, and economic system in the
country, and the charismatic Castro urged them forward. As one of the most adamant
supporters of the literacy campaign, Castro used his post-revolutionary popularity to
garner support for the program. He substantiated this support once the campaign started
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and made himself an active presence at the training site at Varadero and subsequent
m
events related to the 1961 Literacy Campaign.
Ernesto Guevara, known more affectionately as Che, is yet another figure active
in the revolutionary Cuban government who brought much attention and support for the
Literacy Campaign in Cuba. A former medical school student from Argentina, Che’s
slightly mysterious character captured the minds of many Cubans during his time in the
country. As one of Castro's closest associates, Che exemplified his dedication to the
revolution and to the teaching of literacy early, evidenced in his mentions of teaching
112

other guerrillas how to read during their time stationed in the Sierra Maestras.

Like

Castro, Guevara often mentioned the importance of literacy to the revolution and in the
formation of a “new man" who lived independent from all forms of oppressioneconomic, intellectual, political, or diplomatic. The Cuban fascination with Guevara only
intensified following his death in Bolivia, and he remained a figure that Cuban school
children often mentioned and romanticized, showing the longevity of his legacy on the
1 13

island as noted by MacDonald.

Unlike Nicaragua and many other Latin American nations, the Catholic Church
did not possess considerable sway in Cuban culture and affected its literacy campaign
only nominally. The small number of priests on the island limited the influence of the
114

Church, as slightly more than 700 priests served Cuba’s population of nearly 3 million.
Not only did the number of priests contribute to the lack of influence on the island, but

the concentration of Catholic churches in urban areas by primarily Spanish-bom priests
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also distanced the church from the cultural mindset of many people in the country.
particularly those residing in rural areas. Furthermore, a majority of the former
parishioners of the Cuban Catholic church emigrated to the United States or other
countries before or shortly after Batista's removal from power. Even though members of
the Church participated in the Literacy Campaign, the support of the Church proved more
vital to the carrying out of the later Nicaraguan effort.
Nicaragua
Nicaragua varies greatly both geographically and climactically. Centrally located
on the landmass connecting North and South America, the country of Nicaragua is the
largest country by area in Central America and rests between the countries of Honduras
and Costa Rica.

1 15

Mountainous regions divide the country and serve to define the

regions climatologically as well as physically. With mountains(Las Segovias) running
north to south near the Pacific coastline, along the Honduran border, as well as a strand of
active volcanoes along the eastern shore of Lake Managua, the geography of Nicaragua
116

divides the country’s population into three main groups.

For the most part.

Nicaraguans reside in settlements in western Nicaragua nestled between the Pacific
Ocean and the Segovias, in the three main cities, Leon, Managua, and Grenada, in the
central highlands, or in the jungle and river-filled eastern portion of the country in
sparsely populated groups.
Another pertinent aspect of Nicaraguan geography includes the climatic makeup
of the Central American nation. Nicaragua experiences two primary seasons with the
precipitation-filled winter months considered the wet or rainy season and the summer
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months much drier. Although the climate varies regionally, with the inner highlands
experiencing less humidity overall as compared to the marshy Atlantic region, the
seasonal distinctions remain relatively constant across the country. During the wet
season, Nicaragua experiences nearly constant rains, a prevalence of mudslides, high
humidity and relatively temperate temperatures; however, in the summer,the humidity
dissipates and temperatures range in the mid-eighties to nineties.
In addition to the geographic and climatic features that limit the amount of
infrastructure in Nicaragua, the prevalence of natural disasters contributed to the lack of
infrastructure within the country. The 1972 earthquake wrought extensive damage to the
country and caused extensive infrastructural damage to buildings and roads throughout
the country. For the most part, the Nicaraguan government failed to address or improve a
majority of these issues, and Somoza's mishandling of relief efforts even helped to unite
disparate groups against the dictator. The extensive flooding caused by Hurricane Mitch
and the subsequent drought in 1982 once again wrecked roads and buildings across the
country, undoing much of the effort to address lacking or damaged infrastructure in
117

Nicaragua by the Sandinistas.
The availability or existence of infrastructure varied from post-revolutionary
Cuba to Nicaragua. Although both countries overthrew politically oppressive regimes by
way of armed revolution prior to the outset of their respective literacy programs, the
Nicaraguan Revolution caused far more extensive physical damage to infrastructure than
did the Cuban Revolution. During the late seventies- what George Black refers to as the
insurrectionary period”— Somoza’s forces inflicted considerable damage on roads,

I 17

Walker 92.
44

118

buildings, and especially schools in an effort to quash the Sandinistas’ efforts,

One

specific example cited by Black and Bevan in their examination of the state of education
in Nicaragua following the removal of Somoza from power included the extensive
physical damage and looting done to the National Autonomous University of Nicaragua
I 19

(UNAN)by members of the National Guard.
Damage during the war against Somoza's National Guard caused a considerable
amount of infrastructural damage; however, persistent governmental corruption more
greatly contributed to the lack of infrastructure in Nicaragua. For example, international
organizations such as USAID (United States Agency for International Development) and
the World Bank pledged millions of dollars to the country toward investment in
infrastructure-building projects. The Nicaraguan government used a vast majority of
these funds to enlarge the Somozan government bureaucracy and to enrich the Somoza
family itself. Data from USAID corroborated claims of a mismanagement of international
aid by Somoza in 1978 when rural dwellers, who account for nearly 50% of the
120

Nicaraguan population, subsisted on approximately 39 dollars per day.
Although Black and Bevan's study detailed extensive damage of schools during
the insurrectionary period in the late seventies, others, such as American Sheryl Hirshon,
a literacy worker during the 1980 campaign in the village of Muy Muy, noted that more
rural areas that “had never been prosperous enough to attract Somoza and his followers.
or mountainous enough to shelter guerrillas’’ remained relatively unscathed by the

I IK
I Iy
120

Black and Bevan 24.
Black and Bevan 28.
Hirshon and Buller l^.
45

121

revolution.

Although untouched by Somoza, these regions lacked basic infrastructural
122

elements such as roads, which made travel nearly impossible.
The distribution of teachers and schools among the population seriously affected
both the start as well as the continuation of a literacy program in Nicaragua. Prior to the
outset of the National Literacy Crusade, only 299^ of teachers worked in rural areas even
though approximately half of the Nicaraguan population resided in these sparsely
12^

populated regions.

School attendance reflected this disproportionate distribution of

teachers, with over 669f of the students enrolled in primary school hailing from urban
124

areas like the cities of Managua, Granada, and Leon.

One of the primary causes for this

unequal distribution of educators throughout the country once again stemmed from the
government. Somoza often assigned “political favorites” to harder-to-reach, rural
villages, resulting in “phantom teaching appointments” as these “educators” rarely
125

ventured to the area where they had been assigned.
The initial rates of illiteracy recorded by census takers in Cuba and Nicaragua
before starting their literacy initiatives highlighted each country’s infrastmctural issues.
Nicaragua, the country with the larger illiterate population, also had the higher percentage
of people residing in rural areas. For example, rates of illiteracy in the more sparsely
populated eastern departments of Puerto Cabezas, Bluefields, and Rama averaged 75%
126

among Nicaraguans over the age of ten.

In the most rural regions of the country, rates

of illiteracy reached even higher with some areas recording over 90% illiteracy.
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In addition to infrastructure, the dire financial straits of the Nicaraguan economy
following the overthrcn\ of Somoza limited the country's efforts to combat illiteracy
during and after the National Crusade. After Somoza left, only $3.5 million remained in
the Nicaraguan trcasur\', and the country had accrued a considerable amount of debt
127

during the ruling tenure of the Somoza family.

The approximately $1.6 billion owed to

foreign nations constituted the most detrimental feature of this massive, and Sandinista
128

leaders assumed this debt rather than defaulting after the removal of Somoza.

With

foreign debt equaling approximately 90 percent of Nicaragua's yearly GDP,the
Sandinista government faced a difficult obstacle to overcome in trying to implement their
129

various social programs promised during the struggle against Somoza.

Another internal issue unique to Nicaragua involved the existence and use of
languages other than Spanish in the country. Particularly in the eastern half of the
country, populations within Nicaragua utilized a number of languages—sometimes in
130

place of Spanish—including indigenous languages, Miskito or Creole/English,

With a

total population of approximately 2.5 million at the time of the Literacy Crusade,
Nicaragua’s population included 50,000 English speakers and around 100,000 members
131

of various indigenous cultures residing in the eastern portion of Nicaragua.

To address

illiteracy in this region, planners of the 1980 Literacy Crusade incorporated traditional
English or indigenous language speakers interested in participating in the Spanish132

language program, and reduced illiteracy in this eastern coastal region to around 30%.
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Around 88,400 individuals participated in the 1980 Crusade, but the unfamiliarity or
degree of discomfort in even speaking Spanish prevented a number of costenos from
i

participating in the initial campaign.
To counter this linguistic stumbling block, the Nicaraguan Ministry of Education
also implemented a secondary literacy program starting in October 1980. This program
specifically targeted speakers of non-Spanish languages. Albeit carried out with a smaller
sized force, the second wave significantly reduced illiteracy among Atlantic Coast
134

residents to a rate of approximately 229f.

Even though Nicaraguan literacy workers

addressed the needs of non-Spanish speakers during this second wave of the program,
this second Nicaraguan program encountered considerable difficulties in recruiting
volunteers who could work with people in both English and Spanish, relying primarily on
volunteers from other countries.
In addition to infrastructural and linguistic factors affecting the Nicaraguan
Crusade, reticence to participate in the program impeded the efforts of planners of the
Crusade and literacy workers. Workers in both Cuba and Nicaragua encountered a
considerable amount of hesitancy to participate in the program among those reluctant to
admit to their own illiteracy. Nicaragua also had to overcome hesitancy related to fear
over an earlier effort led by the Somozan government. Entitled “Plan Waslala,” this
government-sponsored initiative postured itself as a program to address illiteracy in rural
135

Nicaragua in 1978.

In reality, the program consisted of 108 persons posing as teachers

who worked as spies to root out peasants sympathetic to the FSLN in the mountainous
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region of northern Nicaragua.

The name of the program itself evoked a negative image

as Somoza's counterinsurgency effort masked beneath the guise of a rural literacy
initiative shared the name “Waslala” with a former concentration camp where National
137

Guard members tortured and killed hundreds of Nicaraguan peasants.

Motivation stemming from revolutionary experience affected the Nicaraguan
program more so than in Cuba. Organizers of the Cuban campaign certainly capitalized
on “revolutionary martyrs" in promoting the program itself, the more widespread struggle
in Nicaragua made their use of revolutionary sacrifice more substantial. Thousands of
Nicaraguans had died in the fight to remove Somoza, and the experience remained
entrenched within the nation's consciousness, something acknowledged as well as
utilized by organizers of the Nicaraguan Crusade. In promoting the National Crusade,
organizers presented participation in the program as a way to honor to those lost during
13S

the fight with Somoza.

According to Fernando Cardenal, head of the National Literacy

Crusade, “each person learning to read and write would become a living tribute to the
sacrifice, commitment, and hope of those had given their lives in battle.
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The involvement and incorporation of the Catholic Church in the National
Literacy Crusade greatly benefited the Nicaraguan effort. As the Church held a wellrespected place within Nicaraguan society, Sandinista leaders capitalized on the influence
of the Church in the hopes of not only advancing but possibly ensuring the success of
their various goals, including the 1980 Crusade. Crusade planners also utilized the highly
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organized structure and hierarchy of the church to attract volunteers to the program.
Not only did Nicaraguan leaders work to gamer the support of church leaders within
Nicaragua, but they appealed to outside groups to further their aims relating to the
Literacy Crusade.
The name of the program itself evidences the incorporation of the Church in the
planning and implementation of the National Literacy Cmsade. In choosing the decidedly
religious title of “crusade" over a more secular name like the Cuban “campaign,”
planners of the Nicaraguan program hoped to establish a positive public image of the
literacy program from its inception. In addition to the distinctly pious name of the literacy
plan, the Nicaraguan directorate played to the favor of religiously-minded Nicaraguans
141

by placing the priest. Father Fernando Cardenal, at the head of the entire endeavor.

Nicaraguan leaders created an attractive angle to approach outside religious
entities for assistance by so closely associating the efforts and aims of the National
Literacy Crusade with those of the Catholic Church. Although the United States
government did not necessarily support the Nicaraguan Cmsade, Cmsade leaders
appealed to American evangelical organizations for assistance in carrying out the
Crusade. For example, Tomas Borge, one of the members of the Nicaraguan Directorate
and FSLN, successfully requested eight hundred thousand Spanish-language New
142

Testaments from the United Bible Societies.

Aligning with the Catholic Church and

promoting literacy as a Christian value allowed Nicaraguan leaders to further their cause
with the assistance of the established, traditional power of the Church in the country.
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Nonetheless, their alignment with the Catholic Church and other religious organizations,
many inside and outside the country continued to complain of the pro-FSLN message
promoted through the Literacy Crusade.
Occurring in two geographically unique regions at two historically distinct times,
several variables affected the efficacy of literacy programs implemented in Cuba and
Nicaragua. Planners and participants in the Cuban campaign faced some geographical
and infrastructure-related issues both prior to and during the 1961 campaign; however.
these variables more seriously inOuenced later efforts in Nicaragua. Infrastructural and
financial issues created significant barriers to Nicaraguan literacy workers, but
Nicaraguan Crusade planners made considerable efforts internally to offset the various
internal variables that could potentially hinder their efforts. In addition to infrastructure,
Nicaraguans also contended with a greater degree of linguistic variation within the
country as compared to Cuba and even adapted their program to accommodate both
English and indigenous language speakers. Involvement or input in the programs by the
Catholic Church or other religious groups also varied between the countries with these
groups playing a much more influential role in Nicaragua.
External Variables
External features advanced and impeded the successful implementation of the
Cuban Literacy Campaign and the National Literacy Crusade in Nicaragua along with the
various internal variables. Aid from governmental as well as non-governmental agencies
benefitted each country, but the amount of aid received from the international community
differed from Cuba to Nicaragua. The impact of external pressures directly related to the
Cold War also varied in degree between the programs implemented in Cuba and then

51

Nicaragua. As these countries' powerful northern neighbor, these forces originated in the
United States. The nature and conduct of the Cold War changed considerably within the
nearly twenty years separating these countries' educational endeavors. Therefore, the
amount this “conHict" affected each country naturally reflected this shift.
A brief note on American foreign policy toward Cuba and Nicaragua
With the already frigid relations between the United States and the Soviet Union,
the Cuban Revolution in 1959 represented an intrusion by the Soviet Union into the
Western Hemisphere and a threat to American hegemony in the region to many people in
the United States. Soon after the fall of Batista, US-Cuban relations quickly soured, and
the CIA began actively plotting against the Cuban government and Castro personally.
Although the United States officially pursued a policy of non-intervention, the
relationship between the Soviet Union and Cuba quickly raised suspicions. Due to these
suspicions, the United States' eventually moved away from pursuing a non
interventionist policy toward most of Latin America.
During the Kennedy administration, the United States established several
programs to stimulate internal reform in Latin American nations to prevent them from
becoming susceptible to revolutionary or socialist or communist-friendly activity. These
initiatives included promising $20 million in aid over ten years through the Alliance for
Progress; the Peace Corps, a program that “sent thousands of American volunteers to
‘third world’ countries to start small-scale health, educational, and agricultural projects;”
a Food for Peace program; and the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID), an organization designed to shift foreign capital from military to general
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economic assistance.

14 ^

These programs resulted in mixed levels of success. Kennedy’s

administration intervened actively in Cuba first with the attempted invasion at the Bay of
Pigs (Playa Giron) and then during the Cuban Missile crisis. Following the Cuban Missile
Crisis, the US instead moved to exclude Cuba from the rest of the hemisphere to weaken
Castro's hold on the country rather than continue to organize physical intrusions into the
144

country.
Johnson, for the most part, continued Kennedy's isolation of Cuba rather than
145

attempting to directly intervene in the country.

With the election of Richard Nixon in

1968, Henry Kissinger became the Secretary of State, and he pursued a policy of detente
146

with communist countries like the Soviet Union and China.

Initially supportive of

normalizing relations with Cuba and loosening the trade and diplomatic embargo
imposed on the country during Kennedy's presidency, Cuba’s participation in the
147

liberation movement in Angola quickly reversed Kissinger’s view toward the country.
As for Nicaragua, the United States continued to support Somoza as he represented a
non-leftist stronghold in the region.
Jimmy Carter's administration represented a significant change in American
policy toward Latin America, albeit a confused one. During the campaign. Carter placed
human rights as one of the central of elements of his proposed foreign policy and
distanced himself from the theory of containment to distinguish himself from his
148

Republican opponent.

After becoming President, Carter worked to alter some of
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United Stales' relationships with countries in Latin America, including Cuba and
Nicaragua. For the most pan, however. Carter followed Nixon’s foreign policy model.
Developed by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, this model included elements of
containment as well as detente. In keeping ^'wh detente. President Carter attempted to
normalize relations with Cuba and move toward more bilateral relations with the island
nation; however. Ronald Reagan's 1980 defeat of Jimmy Carter heralded great changes
in the relationships w ith countries across Latin America, including Cuba and Nicaragua.
During Reagan's presidency, the United States more actively pursued its staunchly anti
communist outlook and in doing so rejected the detente promoted by Kissinger.
External contributions to Cuba
The impact of external influence varied greatly in the development of the Cuban
program and the later Nicaraguan program. Whereas Nicaraguan planners relied greatly
on input from outside educational advisors and information published on previously
conducted literacy initiatives, organizers of the Cuban campaign preferred relative
149

autonomy when developing their program.

Prior to the 1961 Cuban Literacy

Campaign, many countries had conducted their own literacy initiatives. The United
Nation’s educational component UNESCO sponsored many of these; however, in
developing its program in the last months of 1960, Cuban planners distanced themselves
from earlier practices and methods, choosing instead to focus on the everyday
experiences of the average Cuban. In addition to nominal outside pedagogical assistance,
the Cuban program received little financial or personnel assistance from outside entities.
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This is nol to suggest that previous efforts had not been made with regard to nationally conducted
literacy programs. Rather, in keeping with the wishes of Dr. Raul Ferrer, the director of die campaign,
Cuban organizers wished tt> develop a program independent of the influence of other individuals or
programs so as to develop st)mething unique to the Cuban experience or cultural understanding.
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Given the relationship between Cuba and the Soviet Union, the USSR provided
necessary financial assistance to Cuba following the United States’ placement of an
150

embargo on the country shortly after Castro assumed power.

For the most part.

however, this assistance manifested itself in contributions to Cuban military rather than
151

scientific, cultural or educational endeavors, like the country’s literacy campaign.

Aside from nominal aid from the Soviet Union, who had yet to formalize relations with
Cuba until after Castro's “Second Declaration of Havana,” Cuba received little assistance
from other external forces when it conducted of its literacy campaign in 1961.^^" Soviet
assistance, however, enabled the Cuban government's ability to carry out programs
implemented as part of the Se^iiimieuto or follow-up plan.
Even with the financial assistance offered to Cuba from the Soviet Union,
relations between the countries remained relatively contentious given the two countries’
somewhat contradictory views on foreign policy and the expansion of Marxist thought.
During the late 1960s, Cuban-Soviet relations “became increasingly acrimonious,’
153

although the Soviet Union continued to support to the Cuban government financially.
By the late seventies, relations between the two countries normalized, reflected in the

signing of an agreement between the Soviet Union and Cuba in 1979 pledging $3 billion
to the island nation. This large sum granted Cuba financial security needed to “attain one
154

of the highest living standards in Latin America.
US-Cuban Relations
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For the first half of the twentieth century, Cuba and the United States enjoyed a
relatively close relationship, with much commerce and travel between the two
countries.

After Castro and his supporters overthrew of Fulgencio Batista in 1959,the

diplomatic, economic, and cultural ties between the two countries quickly began to
dissolve. As Castro worked to nationalize most businesses in Cuba and more closely
align the country with the Soviet Union, the United States became more suspicious of the
charismatic leader and the establishment of a communist nation within reach of the
United States.

I5(>

After several failed attempts to assassinate Castro as well as the

disastrous 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, the United States, in keeping with George
Kennan's idea of “containment,” severed all diplomatic and economic ties with Cuba,
removed its embassy and placed an embargo on all exports from and most imports into
the country.
The CIA-backed invasion at the Bay of Pigs demarcated a poignant moment in
US-Cuban relations. Initially put into motion during the Eisenhower administration and
carried out in the first days of Kennedy's presidency, the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) along with a group of Cuban exiles intended to use an invasion at the Bay of Pigs
157

as the crucial first step in overthrowing Castro’s government in Cuba.

The nearly

immediate failure of this latest American-led effort to enter the island clandestinely and
the repulsion of the exiles attempting to invade the island actually greatly benefitted the
Cuban government. The botched invasion renewed Cuban mistrust of the United States
and Yanqui imperialism and reinvigorated the revolutionary fervor of Castro’s supporters
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both in Cuba and across Latin America.

The timing of this American failure also

proved particularly crucial as the April 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion occurred just prior to
the start of the first refund of training of literacy workers at Varadero.
After the Bay of Pigs disaster, the CIA continued to orchestrate and attempt to
foment rebellions against the Cuban government under the auspices of “Operation
Mongoose." Despite the CIA's efforts through “Operation Mongoose/'their plans rarely
I 5">

gained much traction.

Kennedy's assassination, an escalation of events in Vietnam, and

Johnson's focus on civil rights issues internally led to an increasing lack of interest in
intervention in Cuba, something later acknowledged by Castro in his report to the First
160

Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba(PCC)in 1975.
During the Nixon administration. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger considered
including Cuba in the relaxation of Cold War containment policy promoted under the
auspices of detente: however, Cuba's participation in the armed liberation movement in
161

Angola reversed this move to normalize relations with the country.

Although Carter

also expressed some interest in normalizing relations between the United States and
Cuba, these changes never manifested themselves officially. The only major change in
American policy toward Cuba occurred in 1981 in the immediate wake of the Reagan
Revolution with the publication of the National Security Directive no. 17 ofthe President
of the United States. This document attempted to “develop public pressure against Cuba,
bringing to light human and political rights issues and using the Cuban exile community
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to transmit this message.

■ The directive affected Cuba very little aside from the

development of some new right-wing Cuban-American organizations within the United
States to foster ill will against Castro's Cuba.
Cuban-Soviet Relation.s
Although Cuban leaders did not fear the United States as a “‘direct’ security
threat” follow ing the American failure at the Bay of Pigs, concerns related to the
economic impact of the embargo motivated Cuban leaders to seek assistance from other
16.^

nations, most famously the Soviet Union.

Cuba tied itself closer to the Soviet Union

economically and diplomatically to avoid total isolation following Cuba’s expulsion of
the island from the Organization of American States(OAS)and subsequent severing of
diplomatic ties between nearly every country except Mexico in Latin America.*^ Despite
the eventual thawing of relations between Cuba and most of the nations of Latin America
toward the close of the twentieth century, the United States maintained its economic and
diplomatic isolation of the island, even following the shift in US foreign policy from
165

noninterventionism to the “roll back” plan promoted during the Reagan administration.
Following the invasion at the Bay of Pigs, the removal of Cuba from the
Organization of American States, naval blockade of the island, and the Cuban Missile
crisis, Cuba sought to establish relationships with outside nations. The Soviet Union
quickly appeared to Cuba’s aid, initially in an effort to repair ties damaged during the
166

Cuban Missile Crisis.

Following a visit to Moscow in 1963, Castro decided to abandon

the plans for economic diversification promoted by Ernesto “Che” Guevara and instead
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concentrate on sugar production with the financial assistance of the Soviet Union.

This

relationship between the two nations benefitted Cuba because the country received the
economic help so desperately needed due to its isolation from the United States and the
rest of Latin America: however, the diplomatic ties between Cuba and the Soviet Union
signified a major point of contention between the Cuba and its closest American
neighbor.
External Contributions to Nicaragua
Nicaragua benefitted greatly from foreign aid when conducting its 1980 Crusade
against illiteracy. The Nicaraguan economy, left in shambles by years of war between the
FSLN and National Guard as well as Somoza's corrupt handling of internal revenue and
international aid, forced the Sandinistas to seek assistance from a plenitude of outside
donors both governmental and not. Nicaragua received monetary assistance from a range
of organizations and countries, and the World Council of Churches(WCC)represented
the largest financial supporter of the campaign. Beginning their work in Nicaragua in late
1979, the WCC provided the campaign $500,000 as part of the $5 million requested for
168

the country from the WCC's member churches.
The WCC provided Nicaragua with a substantial amount of financial and
personnel assistance for the National Literacy Crusade; however, Cuba constituted the
most constant source of assistance to the country as the Sandinista triumph over Somoza
»169

finally vindicated Havana’s faith in the region’s leftist potential.

The Soviet Union

and other Eastern European countries also pledged assistance to the fledgling Nicaraguan
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government. Aside from sending some small arms some military advisors, both the
Soviet Union as well as Nicaragua's allies in Eastern Europe avoiding committing
themselves to the defense of Managua or Nicaragua, so as to not raise the ire of the
171)

United States.

The Nicaraguan Crusade also benefitted from its relationships with foreign
entities in the development of the program itself. The coordinators of the National
Literacy Crusade drew e.xtensively from studies published about prior literacy programs
throughout the region and elsewhere in the world and assessed work published by
171

UNESCO, Raul Ferrer, director of the Cuban campaign, and in Guinea Bissau.

In

addition to reviewing the published work of others involved in literacy programs,
Nicaraguan Crusade coordinators also invited several intellectuals to the country to
contribute to the development of the primer as well as the structure of the program
172

itself.

While spending nine days in Nicaragua, Brazilian pedagogical theorist Paulo
Freire provided some, albeit limited, assistance to the planning of the Nicaraguan
Crusade. Despite his abbreviated tenure in the country, Freire’s visit to Nicaragua helped
to “legitimize the Sandinista campaign in the eyes of many in the international
community,” making others more willing to work with the fledgling leaders in their
173

ambitious endeavor.

Although not exactly analogous to the program Freire

implemented in Brazil, planners of the Nicaraguan Crusade benefitted from the assistance
and reputation of Freire in organizing the program, and the resultant plan used in the
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Literacy Crusade mirmred. to some extent, the methods outlined in his earlier work in
174

rural Brazil.

When the crusade itself began in March 1980, assistance from external sources
continued to shape the Nicaraguan Crusade. Cuba, Costa Rica, and the United States
provided the most outside educators and educational advisors, but other countries also
175

contributed to Nicaraguan efforts.

Foreign aid underwrote a large extent of the crusade

given the wrecked slate of the Nicaraguan economy. Because the nearly $1.6 billion
owed to foreign nations forced the Sandinistas to adopt relatively strict fiscal policies to
remain in good favor with entities holding Nicaraguan debt, Nicaraguan leaders appealed
to a variety of countries, government-sponsored organizations, and non-governmental
organizations for financial assistance. In the last days of the Carter administration,
Nicaraguan leaders petitioned specifically for a continuation of funding from the Agency
of International Development(USAID) previously granted to Nicaragua under Somoza.
The Carter Administration initially granted this renewal, despite the reservations
concerning Nicaraguan leadership.
US-Nicaraguan Relations
As opposed to Cuba, the relationship between the United States and Nicaragua
has been much more tenuous. Considered as a site for the transoceanic canal eventually
constructed in Panama, major economic development and infrastructure work often
pandered to American business interests that invested in the country-- most notably those
of Cornelius Vanderbilt whose railroad connected the Atlantic and Pacific coast in the
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In additicin to competing American business enterprises at work in the

country.

country, Nicaraguans dc\ eloped a distinct distaste for what they viewed and interpreted
as unbridled American imperialism in Latin America, especially in their country, due to
their experiences during the multiple American occupations including forces under
filibusterer William Walker and United States Marines in Nicaragua during the
177

nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Even after the departure of the Marines on

January 1, 1933, the American-trained Nicaraguan National Guard remained as a
reminder of the United States' continued interest and influence in the Central American
I7S

country.
Following the removal of the Marines, the United States pursued a relatively noninterventionist stance toward Nicaragua, although Somoza continued to benefit from
179

military spending courtesy of the United States,

In the 1970s, the FSLN’s growing

popularity in Nicaragua coupled with the Sandinistas' ties to Cuba heightened suspicions
of some working in the US government toward Nicaragua. Although these initial fears
manifested themselves among government officials, most notably in the form of an
advertisement purchased by one hundred members of Congress and five Senators titled
Congress Asks: Please, Mr. President, Not Another Cuba!,” the assassination of ABC
correspondent Bill Stewart sparked widespread concern and interest in Nicaragua in the
180

United States.

Many remained suspicious of the left-leaning Sandinistas, but news of

the atrocities committed by Somoza’s National Guard, including Stewart’s assassination,
led to an increase in an anti-Somozan sentiment within the United States.
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Soon after the triumph of the Sandinistas over Somoza’s forces in August 1979,
the specter of communism in Latin America once again haunted the thoughts of many
Americans given the relationship between the Cuban government andtheFSLN.
Reluctant to align too closely with the Sandinistas, the Carter administration maintained a
tenuous yet relatively functional relationship with the Sandinistas. Reagan’s election in
November 1980 represented a major shift in the focus of American foreign policy as
conservative groups such as the Santa Fe Committee pushed for several changes in U.S.
isi

policy toward Latin America.

These changes included a significant increase in an

American presence across Latin America but most specifically in the target nations of
Cuba, Brazil, and Mexico. US scrutiny also focused on countries allied or aligned with
182

these target nations in any substantial way.
The Reagan administration's abandonment of Carter’s policy regarding human
rights proved to have its greatest impact on Nicaragua, as the US equated internal
revolutionary movements with aggression against external forces or nations and resolved
to act “decisively against any manifestation of social rebellion, including ‘liberation
9

theology.
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This shift in policy caused the US government to pay a great deal of

American attention on Central America and Nicaragua in particular.

The United States

quickly mobilized efforts against the Sandinistas; manifesting America’s altered view
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toward Latin America during Reagan's presidency.

American influence or involvement

in Nicaragua exhibited itself in all facets of Nicaraguan life from the country’s relations
with other ccumtries to non-governmental organizations and elections, and eventually in
the form of the hiuhlv destructive Contra War.
Preparation for armed eontlict in Nicaragua began almost immediately following
Reagan's inauguration in January 1980. In keeping with Reagan’s promise to develop “a
plan and a hope for the long term

the march of freedom and democracy that will leave

Marxism-Leninism on the ash-heap of history," the United States began to invest heavily
in a buildup of nuclear arms, conventional weaponry, and most importantly covert and
overt support of opponents in a variety of communist or left-leaning countries including
1K6

Nicaragua.

This support of anti-Sandinista forces living both inside Nicaragua and in

exile quickly escalated into a heavily US-sponsored armed conflict against the
Sandinistas by a group of contnirrevolucionarios (counterrevolutionaries), shortened to
Contras. Nicaraguans felt the effects of the Contras as these forces sporadically entered
the country and mounted small-level attacks primarily in rural areas. These trans-border
endeavors by the Contras directly threatened literacy workers and resulted in the deaths
of several Nicaraguan brigadistas.
The Contra War represented the most consistent and destructive way American
authorities maintained their interests in Nicaragua. As Peter Mayo points out,“the Contra
War proved to be the best means of undermining the [Sandinista] revolution” as it not
only exhausted the material and financial resources of the country, but the people
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to the relatively pi^sitivc reports issued by the Amcriean-based Latin American Studies
192

Association (LASA) as well as bairopean delegations that observ^ed the election.

In both C'uba and Nieaiagua. external variables significantly impacted each
program, with the intluenee of these variables decidedly more negative in the 1980
Nicaraguan Crusade. Siune of these external variables, including financial support from
other countries like the Soviet I’nion to Cuba or organizations like the World Council of
Churches to Nicaragua, greatly bene fitted the efforts in both countries to push forth their
plans to address illiteracy. Other externalities, however, proved to be more detrimental to
each country, w ith the I’S's shift in policy toward each country as the most influential.
Although the US government did not support Castro's government and even coordinated
several efforts to overthrow the Cuban government, the failure of the Bay of Pigs
invasion in early 1961 and the subsequent emigration of many potential
counterrevolutionaries from Cuba caused the US to rework

its approach in dealing with

the island nation. The United States adopted and pursued a less intrusive plan that
focused on isolating the country financially, diplomatically, and politically from the rest
of the hemisphere. By 1980, public opinion and policy in the US changed, and the
country adopted a much more proactive stance toward defending the hemisphere from
perceived communist threats. This shift not only impacted Nicaragua's ability to carry
out its 1980 Crusade, but also made it increasingly more difficult for the Nicaraguan
government to implement subsequent measures to ensure the successes reached during
the five-month program.
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siKCfssrul wiTo tluvse projirams?
Althcuigh man\ lia\c cjucsnoncci ihc exact numbers published by the Cuban and
Nicaraguan gcnernmenis eoneerning illueraey both before and after their respective
literacy programs, these programs made significant advances toward lowering the
number of illiterate adults m each eountr\. In addition to the Cuban Campaign and the
Nicaraguan Crusade leading to higher rates ot literacy in each country, both programs
also helped to bridge the \ ast di\ ide separating urban and rural populations as well as
upper and middle-class residents from urban poor or eampesinos; to expand the social
roles and resptmsibiliiies td \\ omen: to generate support for each country's revolutionary
governments and to ser\ e as a stuirce of national pride. The success of Cuban and
Nicaraguan programs extended beyond the borders of each country, as these countries’
experiences in developing and carrying out extensive nationwide literacy initiatives had
(and has) international implications, particukuiy in the field of adult literacy education.
Increase in school attendance
In both Cuba and Nicaragua, one of the primary problems associated with
illiteracy stemmed from low or no school attendance among illiterate populations.
Therefore, an increase in school attendance in urban and rural areas across both countries
marked a successful result of both the 1961 National Literacy Campaign and the 1980
National Literacy Crusade. As MacDonald noted in reference to the Cuban campaign, the
“first impact of the revolution was a spectacular quantitative increase in all the indices,”
school attendance. More importantly, however, qualitative improvements,needed to
19.1

follow initial quantitative gains to pre.serve gains made during literacy programs.
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hi'oK iiK TcasCti signillcamlN aficr liie 1961 Cuban

c c \ e a I s ptioi to (Ik- t-amiMign in 195S. approximately 737.000

students reuularU aueiulci.i pi iin.n \ school. H>

thl^ number increased to around

1.350.()()() sUklenis. lellcciinc an increase troiii 50' < I*'"' SOS among children aged seven
to fourteen.

I'M

Although the C ul\in cvoernineiu iniiiall) experienced some difficulty in

accommixlaling this dramatic inciease in students, the C'uban goNcrnment made a
concerted cOort to pro\ ide jiios isional classroom s|\ice until it could pro\ ide more
permanent educailmud lacdines.
Following the Nicaraguan Crusade.

SL

IkhM attendanee increased signifieanil\-. B\

1982, two years afie!' the close of the program, school attendance had doubled from its
1978 level.

no .

To accommodate hieher le\ els of attendanee. the Nicaraguan government.

utilizing a signil'icant amount of outside financial assistance, began constructing new
schools or repairing schools destroNCLl (.iuriim the' Nicaraguan Revolution. Nicaraguan
leaders worked to impro\ c roails ; icross the eouniiA. particularly in the traditionally
underserved, rural areas. A dramatic increase in war-related expenditures, however,
precluded this short-lived governmental in\e.'stnient in its educational infrastrueture. B y
the mid-eighties, the Nicarr^tguan government halted all government-sponsored school
1%

construction as war-related expenditures consumed over half the national budget,

Th e

disruptive ellecls ol war also negatively alTeelcd .school attendance, and the number of
.students enrolled and regularly attending schools dropped consistently through the
turbulent eighties.
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Closing economic/geographic di\ icle
Priiir

ihc Cub.m Rc\v>1uiumi.'the tciKlal acceptance of upper and lower class

positions, ricli and potw . l^as) sidl a dominant feature of society.

The presers alion of

traditional social simciures gieaiU snatified C'uban society \\ ith upper-class men and
women h(dding few or no responsibilities, instead relying upon the work oflower-class
domestic W'orkers in then hvMnes.

1

The concentration ot wealth among approximately

20% of the population strati lied Nicaraeuan society, and men and women within this
group did little to no work. espcciall\ nmie that required physical labor. Economic and
geographic divides in the population persisted after the removal of Batista and Somoza,
and the new' leaders in each ccHinti > sought to implement wide-reaching social programs
to address these issues. The Sandinistas of ciuirse included a nationwide literacy
y program
as a key piece among their social pixigrams.
Although not a primary goal of the Cuban Literacy Campaign or the Nicaraguan
Literacy Crusade, the programs in each country narrowed the economic and geographic
divides within Cuba and Niicaragua. For the most part, the literacy programs provided an
opportunity for primarily middle-class, urban youths to experience impoverished, rural
life. Tho.se who worked in the programs in
in both
countries often noted their shock after
_
seeing how most of the participants lived, a .sentiment included in the nanatives by
Jonathan Kozol, Sheryl Hirshon, and Valerie Miller- Through participation in the
programs, many literacy worke rs not only came to understand the people with whom they
worked but could also bett
er conceptualize the vast income disparities that characterized
each nation.
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she taught provided insight into the struggles faced by many Nicaraguans and exposed
203

her to a lifestyle she knew little to nothing of prior to her participation.
In addition to the experience in the campaign itself, Cuba attempted to bridge the
regional and economic gap while still promoting educational improvements through its
countryside schools. Constructed in each of Cuba's provinces, these schools offered free
education for children in grades six through ten, with students participating in three hours
204

of agricultural work per day.“

The inclusion of agricultural work in these countryside

.schools served two primary purposes. First, the Cuban government hoped the exposure
and experience in agricultural work would work to integrate the heavily-stratified social
205

classes in Cuba, starting with the children participating in the work.

Financial necessity

constituted the second purpose, as the agricultural output of the schools defrayed the cost
of constructing and maintaining the school, and the Cuban government hoped the ability
to earn money through the work would address delinquency among poorer students who
206

often left school to help their families during planting and harvest seasons.

Literacy programs conducted in Cuba and Nicaragua addressed narrowing the
economic and geographic divide crippling each country. The construction of new schools
and roads in both countries gave a greater percentage of the population access to primai-y
and secondary schooling, something severely lacking in the rural areas in both countries
where illiteracy was highest. Programs included as part of the follow-up measures in
Cuba and Nicaragua helped many reach “literacy” even after the programs had officially
ended. Follow-up programs included small, local reading groups in Nicaragua and were
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essential to achieving the program’s goals due to the time constraints shorter length of the
207

Nicaraguan Crusade."

Technical training in Cuba and Nicaragua served to close the

economic chasm as it allowed those trained to obtain higher paying positions.
Farmer-Worker Training
Both Cuba and Nicaragua used their literacy programs to transition into more
advanced educational initiatives to close the economic divide. Farmer-worker educational
programs constituted the most substantial way in which Cuba and Nicaragua sought
address the issue of economic inequality and established these programs after the
conclusion of each country’s initial program. The specific format of the programs
differed greatly from on-the-job vocational training to more formalized colleges to
prepare individuals to enter universities, and each one of the programs sought to address
the problems related to the vast economic divides in the countries as well as the stunted
state of industrialization and lack of technical progress in all fields. Cuba and Nicaragua
developed some programs to train workers to participate in an industrial setting, but the
majority focused on topics and issues concerning agriculture as both countries’
economies depended on the export of agricultural products.
The Minimum Vocational Training Programs represented the most basic series of
courses offered to Cuban workers, and they consisted of six to eight months of training
focused to a specific field (often agriculture) as well as heavily emphasized Spanish and
basic arithmetic.208 Other transitional programs included “People’s Schools’’ that targeted
farmers left jobless due to automation and mechanization. These schools included courses
in “cultural studies’’(arithmetic, Spanish) and training for a new job. Worker’s
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Preparatory Colleges made up another portion of the Cuban worker-farmer educational
initiatives, and these “colleges" prepared undereducated farmers and workers to enter
209

affiliated Cuban universities to further their studies in a technical field."

Even though the worker-farmer programs established in Cuba allowed many
Cubans to further their education and therefore expand their ability to participate
economically, politically, and socially in the country, the programs encountered some
difficulties. Dr. Raul Ferrer, the Director of Worker-Farmer Education, admitted that the
Cuban worker-farmer faced a multitude of complications including shortages of books
210

and teachers in rural areas as well as retention of pupils and instructors,

Despite the

issues faced by the worker-farmer education programs, they attained a measurable degree
of success, with 70% of those who had learned to read during the 1961 Campaign
enrolling in one or more of the programs offered within the Department of Worker21 1

Farmer Education.

The Sandinistas used their National Literacy Crusade as a stepping stone to
further educational programs tailored for laborers and those working in agriculture.
Advances in agriculture presented themselves as the most pressing area of need as most
farmers utilized severely antiquated farming techniques. Concentrated ownership of land
among a limited number of wealthy landowners left a majority of the fertile Nicaraguan
212

landscape vastly underutilized.

The confiscation and redistribution to peasants or

government run cooperatives of lands previously held by the Somoza family and his
supporters contributed to the worker-farmer educational programs as newly available
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land served as an incentive for many to participate in the various programs associated
213

with this .specific initiative.“

Although approximately 80,000 Nicaraguan peasants

benefitted from agrarian reform, the devastating financial impact of the Contra War
forestalled more extensive land distribution projects or worker-farmer educational
initiatives, especially in regions most affected by Contra-related violence.”*"^
Expanded Role of Women
Aside from the gains made in both countries to lower rates of illiteracy, each
program expanded the roles and opportunities offered or available to girls and women in
Cuba and Nicaragua. Women and girls participated on both sides of the campaigns,
taking part as students as well as teachers and/or other logistical or support roles, and this
participation allowed many their first chance to work outside the home and live
autonomously. The participation of women and girls in Cuba and Nicaragua also worked
to break down some of the social stratification that had resulted from the vast disparities
in income between gender groups in both countries.
One of the explicit goals of the Cuban revolution included guaranteeing
economic, political, and social equality of Cuban men and women,and revolutionary
government in Cuba viewed the literacy campaign as the essential first step toward
actualizing that goal. Prior to the Cuban Revolution, the majority of Cuban women
worked in menial positions as farm workers or in domestic jobs. Castro’s government
acknowledged that the only way to incorporate this wide segment of the population into
Cuba’s agricultural and industrial revolution necessitated “improve[ing] their cultural and
technical education and to find them work adapted to their ability to free them from
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economic and social subjection.”

During the campaign itself, women played an

instrumental role, as volunteers and as participants. To continue the strides toward
expanding literacy among Cuban women, the Cuban government established the
Department of Schools for Women's Educational ImprovemenUOhead imUalives to
216

further integrate women into the social, political, and economic spheres in the country."
Two of the central organs of this Department consisted of the “night school for
menial workers” established in Havana in 1961 and the Ana Betancourt School for
farmwomcn. By 1962. 20.000 women had enrolled in the Havana night school conducted
in sixty locations in the city and surrounding province, taking courses in driving training,
217

typing, shorthand, and business administration.

Pupils at the Ana Betancourt School

included girls from rural provinces, with most originating from Oriente Province. These
girls attended the school on government scholarships to take courses in a variety of
subjects, with the best students continuing in agricultural technology."'^ Ana Lorenzo
noted in her 1962 report for UNESCO that Cuba expanded the availability of educational
opportunities for women in the following year (1963) and continued to do so in
2U)

subsequent years.

Nicaraguan women benefilted greatly from its 1980 National Literacy Crusade.
With women and girls constituting sixty percent of the volunteer teaching corps, they
clearly played a crucial role in the implementation of the program, and participation
offered many their first chance to leave their sheltered home lives to take advantage of a
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host of new opportunities and responsibilities.

In addition to those working as literacy

volunteers, other Nicaraguan women organized themselves into “mothering committees’
who worked to motivate others to participate in the literacy program as well as to provide
221

“logistical and moral support" to the brigadistas in the field.
National Pride/Support for Revolutionary Governments
Utilizing a decidedly political message in both programs, leaders in both Cuba
and Nicaragua aimed to rally support for the revolutionary governments through their
literacy initiatives and to develop a sense of revolutionary nationalism or national pride.
The manner each country carried out this objective varied; however, the purpose
remained the same. In provoking a positive response through the use of nationalist
symbols, leaders in each country hoped participants would then create a natural
association between the revolutionary governments and these symbols. One element
central to this development of a sense of national pride through the literacy programs in
Cuba and Nicaragua included a focus on individuals important to the country or
revolution itself. Even though the Cuban and Nicaraguan focus on individuals did not
exactly reflect Freirean pedagogical methods, the names of these individuals represented
a reality of those participating on all sides of the program.
Castro’s personal appeal proved to be central to the Cuban ability to foster
support for revolutionary aims. An avid supporter of the program, Castro made himself
particularly available and visible at all stages of the 1961 Campaign. In interviews with
participants in the Cuban campaign, Kozol showed how the avid support and visibility of
the Cuban leader during the campaign proved essential to recruiting volunteers and later
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molivaiing them to continue in their contributions lo revolutionary aims. After their stint
as hrigadistas. many participants joined civic organizations like the Committees for the
Defense o\' the Revolution, which provided social services to underser\^ed or
impoverished Cubans.
One element of Cuban life that reflects the legacy of the Literacy Campaign as
well as its association with the State government is the museum dedicated to the
campaign itself. Located on the grounds of a school converted from a military base in
Marianao. a suburb west of Ha\’ana. the museum houses memorabilia of the campaign
including brigadista uniforms, the characteristic lantern carried by all literacy teachers,
bound copies of the teachers' reports concerning their experiences in the field, as well as
the “Dear Fidel" letters composed by those who successfully completed the literacy
22?>

program.

Cuban .schools also worked to instill or enhance national and revolutionary

pride from the literacy campaign.
In Nicaragua, Augusto Sandino represented the most obvious use of symbolic
imagery to evoke a positive nationalist response. A Nicaraguan guerilla leader who
fought against U.S. Marine forces in the country and who first Somoza later killed in
224

1934, Sandino had almost a mythological image in the minds of many Nicaraguans.

Materials used during the Crusade played upon the image and legacy of Augusto Sandino
and dedicated the first chapter of the primer to him. Unlike the Cubans, however,
organizers of the Nicaraguan Crusade did not seek to develop a “cult of personality”
around the members of the National Directorate or ruling junta members but instead
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focused on the heroes of the recently concluded war, including FSLN founder Carlos
Fonseca (killed in 1976) as well as the various students and other Nicaraguans killed by
supporters of Somoza.""'^
In addition to the promotion of the FSLN as the current representatives of
Sandino's nationalistic aims, the Sandinistas also extensively referenced Somoza as the
cause for the plenitude of problems faced by Nicaraguans and the country as a whole. A
25% reduction in Nicaragua’s gross national product in 1979 forced the Sandinistas to
adopt strict austerity measures, and they communicated their rationale for the harsh
economic conditions through the campaign stating in the primer,“To spend little, to
conserve resources, and to produce much is to make the revolution,

,226

Aligning

themselves with symbolic images and individuals central to Nicaraguan nationalist
thought and in presenting themselves in stark contrast to Somoza,the FSLN generated
some degree of support among campesinos, but the most significant growth of support
came from the ranks of the literacy workers themselves.
Now fully experienced in the harsh realities faced by their impoverished
countrymen in the countryside as well as in cities, most former brigadistas “continued to
volunteer to work at harvest time or in civil and military defense,” showing a greater
interest in health and rural life in general due to their experiences during the campaign.227
Other volunteer groups within Nicaragua worked to bolster support for the Literacy
Crusade and other social programs initiated by the Sandinistas, viewing these
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improvements as an objective shared by all Nicaraguans."* Even though the study
conducted by Jan Flora, John McFadden, and Ruth Warner observed that thirteen percent
of participants attributed their decrease in revolutionary support to the National Literacy
Crusade, a majority of participants reflected positively upon their experience and
229

Sandinista leadership."
Expansion of studies on pedagogy
Both the Cuban and Nicaraguan literacy programs contributed greatly to the field
of pedagogy, specifically in addressing adult illiteracy. Prior to the Cuban Campaign in
1961, few had attempted field research or official studies regarding illiteracy, and those
that existed had been by and large unsuccessful. Although the field itself had expanded
by 1980 when Nicaragua conducted its National Literacy Crusade, their program offered
an opportunity to put into practice the theories developed by Paulo Freire in the mid
sixties. Both programs influenced the shift in literacy teaching and program models from
the previously relied-upon Laubach method to the more participatory and socially
contextualized methods promoted by thinkers like Freire.
Although UNESCO immediately acknowledged the work done to lower levels of
illiteracy in Cuba, the organization did not adopt or adapt the Cuban program to literacy
campaigns conducted by itself or its affiliates until much later. In 1965, UNESCO
230

announced it would conduct twelve pilot literacy programs.

With approximately

thirty-two million dollars at its disposal, UNESCO conducted eleven programs and, each
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eventually failed."^‘ This failure is especially peculiar as the organization had extensive
information about the 1961 Cuban campaign in the form of a report compiled by Dr. Ana
232

Lorenzetto."

At the 1965 meeting of UNESCO in Tehran, Dr. Raul Ferrer, the head of the
Cuban Literacy Campaign, brought and distributed five hundred copies of Lorenzetto’s
study that UNESCO initially refused to publish."'^^ During the course of the conference
and in subsequent years, Cuban leaders continued to advocate for a publishing of
Lorenzetto's study in full by UNESCO,but objections over the explicitly political
message within the Cuban program made UNESCO leaders hesitant to comply. In 1965,
234

UNESCO finally published Lorenzetto’s study, although on a limited scale.

UNESCO

eventually published a review of the Cuban program compiled under Ferrer by the
Educational Development Centre in Havana.”'^^ Ferrer’s work, along with Lorenzetto’s,
helped to revolutionize the focus in studies on literacy from the stmctured methodical
approach preferred by UNESCO to the socio-culturally focused, participatory approach
used in Cuba, a method also promoted by Brazilian Paulo Freire.
Who was more successful? Why?
Given its ability to more extensively implement the Seguimiento (follow up plan)
and thus preserve the gains made during its literacy program, Cuba’s 1961 Literacy
Campaign was more successful than its 1980 Nicaraguan counterpart. From the outset,
Cuba faced fewer obstacles including infrastructural, geographical, or linguistic issues
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and enjoyed far greater levels of political stability during the 1961 Literacy Campaign
and subsequent years following its initial effort to eradicate illiteracy. Cuba also did not
suffer the destabilizing effects of a war or face nearly constant invasion by
counterrevolutionary forces. In addition to success within the country, Cuba’s program
profited on an international scale as others-including Nicaragua-- looked to the program
when developing their own literacy programs. Fifteen countries have even enjoyed Cuban
assistance on a more practical level in the form of Cuban teachers or educational advisors
to help carry out literacy efforts in these other nations.
Ability to maintain intra-national stability
Intra-national stability proved absolutely vital to the preservation of the gains
achieved during the literacy campaign conducted in Cuba. With the presence of antigovernmental forces in both countries, the Nicaraguan and Cuban governments had to
control the possible destabilizing actions these groups could implement. Although both
countries experienced some degree of counterrevolutionary activity, the Cuban
government’s ability to control and limit the destructive effects of anti-govemmental
forces remaining in the country following the Bay of Pigs invasion certainly played a role
in the its continuation of educational programs, as compared to Nicaragua. The timing of
the Cuban campaign most significantly affected how anti-government forces shaped the
implementation of the literacy program because by the time the Cuban Literacy
Campaign began in 1961, most political dissidents had left the island,
counterrevolutionary attempts at Castro and his government had already proven
unsuccessful, and Castro had spent two years consolidating political power.
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Shortly after Castro took control in the Cuban government,opponents began
organizing plans to remove him and his supporters from power. After the failed invasion
at the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban government detained those working internally against
Castro's government who did not leave the island as exiles, effectively destroying
counterrevolutionary momentum."'^^ Anti-govemmental forces persisted in making
attempts to thwart the efforts of Castro, and these efforts resulted in the death of some
literacy workers, most famously Manuel Ascunce Domenesch; however,for the most
part, the Cuban government quashed most attempts to dismpt the Literacy Campaign or
237

subsequent government programs related to education.
As opposed to the Cuban government’s relatively successful containment of
political dissent within the country, the FSLN-led Nicaraguan government contended
with a considerable amount of dissent internally. This dissent, especially within the
Nicaraguan government itself, proved relatively detrimental to the Sandinista’s ability to
implement the various social programs. La Prensa, the largest newspaper in Nicaragua,
and its publisher Violeta Chamorro represented a significant source of dissent against the
Sandinista government, and Chamorro even resigned from her place on the junta within
months of the Sandinista Revolution.238 Dissent in Nicaragua included criticism of the
1980 Literacy Crusade as some, including Alfonso Robelo, complained,“was being
organized in such a way as to manipulate the poor and the ignorant for ideological or
partisan political ends.
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When governmental power transferred in 1990 from the Sandinistas to Violeta
Barrios Chamorro the more conservative UNO party, dissent to Sandinista social
programs including education continued under the leadership of the new ruling group.
During Chamorro's presidency, Nicaragua adopted harsh austerity measures to comply
with the wishes of lending organizations including the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund. Chamorro's adoption of austere fiscal practices led to cuts to many of
the social programs initiated by the Sandinistas, including education. In addition to
austere spending practices, Chamorro’s government also sought to “de-Sandinize”
education. Efforts to this extent included replacing the culturally and socially relevant
“Carlitos” primer with a more generic version supplied by USAID funds; hiring only
members of the UNO-friendly Nicaraguan Teachers’ Union Federation rather than
members of ANDEN,a group traditionally supportive of the Sandinistas; and laying off
or transferring 370 teachers for primarily political reasons.240
Public reinvestment in education
As the continuation of efforts to expand educational opportunities for Cuban and
Nicaraguan citizens proved to be particularly crucial to preserving gains made during the
initial literacy programs, government expenditures once again highlight the disparity
between the two nations. Public spending in the field of education serves as one clear
way to help to explain Cuba’s ability to ensure the success of its 1961 Campaign. For
example, during the 2007 fiscal year the World Bank reported that public expenditures on
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education constituted 11.99c of Cuba’s gross domestic product(GDP).

In the years

since the 1961 Campaign, education-related expenditures have consistently equaled at
least 109c of the country's GDP. The substantial percentage marked for education not
only evidences Cuba's national focus on providing education to its citizens but also helps
to explain the Cuban ability to maintain its success in addressing illiteracy in the country.
Nicaragua, on the other hand, spends a significantly smaller amount on public
education, something reflected in their considerably higher levels of illiteracy. According
to the audit performed by USAID in 2008, spending on education only made up 2.2% of
the Nicaraguan GDP during the 2007 fiscal year.*"^" In the years since the completion of
its literacy campaign, Nicaragua has consistently underspent on education compared to
Cuba. Although initially the result of the extreme financial constraints caused by the
Contra War, the defeat of the Sandinistas and election of Violeta Chamorro and the UNO
in 1990 proved more detrimental to education. Throughout the 1990s, Chamorro’s
administration continued to make considerable cuts in social spending, especially
education. Even though increased spending in education does not necessarily yield better
results, the gulf between the amount dedicated to public education in Cuba and Nicaragua
to some extent explains Cuba’s ability to better address illiteracy in the years since its
1961 Campaign.
Cubans international influence
Certainly, the influence the Cuban program has had and continues to have
internationally evidences the country’s success with regard to its 1961 Literacy
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Campaign. Even after the clo.se of their own program, Cuba maintained its support of
global literacy initiatives, albeit for some political reasons. Political motivations aside,
Cuba's persistent contribution to work in other countries remains noteworthy. The Cuban
government has prov ided advisory help and Cuban teachers to literacy programs across
the globe. In the years since its own literacy campaign, Cuba has contributed to literacy
programs in fifteen countries, with the most extensive assistance going to its Nicaraguan
allies in 1980.
C'uba did not confine its educational influence to physical contributions to other
countries' literacy programs. Its program also .served as a mode\ foT SCXCtdl subsequenr
educational initiatives following the publishing of the Lorenzetto study on the Cuban
Campaign as well as Paulo Freire's dissemination of Cuban pedagogical methods and
techniques in conjunction with his own following his 1963 visit to the island. The impact
ol the 1961 Literacy Campaign extended past the field of literacy with thinkers in other
fields also influenced and impressed by the accomplishments made during the program.
For example, French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre commended the Cuban revolution for
its ability to reply to the material needs of its people through its social programs, most
243

specifically the Literacy Campaign and agrarian reform.
Although initially hesitant to award Cuba for its work due to the possible political
repercussions, UNESCO eventually awarded Cuba a King Sejong Literacy Prize in 2006
for the country's continued dedication to the promotion of literacy in its country and
244

abroad.^
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technology and teaching methods into the original Cuban program. The constant
updating, revising, and adapting of the original Cuban program model reflects the
country's dedication to literacy even after completing its own campaign in 1961. These
processes are essential to remaining culturally and socially relevant to those participating
in literacy programs, an idea central to the Cuban program and its initial success.
Nicaragua
In determining success, however, one would be remiss in failing to note the
resourcefulness of the Nicaraguan effort and the country’s ability to make strides toward
lowering or eliminating illiteracy given the dire economic, political, and diplomatic
straits of the country prior to and during the Crusade itself. The Sandinista’s insistence on
“non-alignment" deserves mention as a noble facet of the Nicaraguan program as it
helped Nicaragua curry favor with some countries and organizations that responded by
aiding the nation in its educational endeavors. The incorporation of the Catholic Church
and Christian teachings into the program requires specific mention, as this proved cmcial
to the crusade’s success. Unfortunately, the numerous obstacles before Nicaragua and its
brigadistas proved to be relatively insurmountable, making their efforts to reduce
illiteracy less statistically successful than the Cuban program. According to a 1983
UNESCO report, the Literacy Crusade, in conjunction with other government programs
enacted during the early years of Sandinista rule including expanded health services.
price controls for “basic foodstuffs” and some subsidies “stimulated improvement in the
living standards of the working classes,” a considerable step forward for a nation so
245

wrecked by years of government graft and revolutionary instability.‘
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Dedication to non-alignment
Nicaragua stood apart from Cuba in one way through its dedication to nonalignment. As the country required outside assistance to keep the country afloat after the
massive accrual of debt during the Somoza years, Sandinista leaders made a concerted
effort not to align too closely with any one country in a way that would alienate it from
another. For example, the FSLN had a long-standing and close relationship with Cuba;
however, Nicaragua shied away from establishing too close a relationship with Cuba’s
ally, the Soviet Union, for fear of raising suspicions in the United States. The one-year
anniversary celebration for the triumph of the Sandinistas over Somoza served as one
instance in which Nicaraguan leaders attempted to display their dedication to nonalignment, as the invitees to the event included representatives from the Soviet Union,
246

Cuba, and a large delegation from the United States."
Despite the Sandinistas’ attempt at non-alignment, their support of Salvadoran
rebels eventually served as the justification for the US’s withdrawal of support for the
Nicaraguan government in 1980. Initially, the most detrimental factor of the United
Slates ending its support of Nicaragua included a halt of US foreign aid to the country. In
1980, US aid to Nicaragua totaled $15 million and would have increased $35 million
according to the proposed 1981 budget.^"^^ Although the loss of funds destabilized the
country to some extent, the outset of the US-sponsored Contra War further complicated
Nicaragua’s ability to ally itself with other countries, as many feared a negative backlash
from the United States.
Churches
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The incorporation of Christian groups, and more specifically, the Catholic
Church, rellected yet another area in which the Nicaraguan planners displayed their
resourcefulness in developing and implementing the 1980 Literacy Cmsade.""^^ A variety
of organizations supported the work of the Literacy Crusade; however, the support of the
Church proved especially crucial as it provided the stability of an established hierarchy.
This alliance also helped to dispel suspicions that the Nicaraguan government intended to
use the program to spread pro-FSLN propaganda among mral populations. The support
of the Catholic Church and other religious organizations backed the Cmsade financially
and supplied volunteers and support staff for the program itself. The World Council of
Churches, a Protestant organization that included approximately 38 different groups,
served as the greatest source of financial assistance, donating $500,000 to the 1980
249

Crusade.”

Despite the split within the Nicaraguan Church over the teachings of

liberation theology and the FSLN itself, the Church as a whole remained supportive of
Sandinista efforts to increasing literacy.

Conclusion
When assessing the literacy programs conducted by Cuba and Nicaragua in 1961
and 1980, it is difficult to definitively say whether or not either program succeeded
absolutely. Such a judgment may not even be fair to make. Even though both countries
had recently emerged from a revolutionary struggle, the Nicaraguan Revolution damaged
the country physically, fiscally, and psychologically far more than the earlier Cuban
Revolution. Castro’s Cuba, albeit relatively dependent on exports from the United States,
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did not inherit $1.6 billion worth of foreign debt and a country decimated by years of
250

armed struggle as the Sandinistas would experience in 1979.
The state of each country during the implementation of each literacy program is
yet another issue worth considering. Nicaragua had to overcome considerable
infrastructural hurdles to mobilize literacy workers in the geographically challenging
rural departments where most of the populations targeted by the Literacy Crusade
resided. A country divided by geographical barriers, Nicaraguan brigadistas encountered
considerable difficulty in even reaching their assigned positions, much less acclimating
themselves to the campesino lifestyle practiced by those with which they lived and
worked. The relationship each country shared with the United States; however, proved to
be the most influential factor on the ability of each program to preserve gains made
during its literacy programs.
Although the US did not support Castro or his government,following the failure
at the Bay of Pigs the United States pursued a much less intrusive approach in dealing
with the island nation. Nicaragua, on the other hand, became a primary focus of the US
following the Sandinista victory over Somoza, and the US-sponsored Contra War only
further depleted the few resources available to the Nicaraguan government, eventually
forcing the Sandinistas to halt school construction and new educational endeavors by the
mid-eighties. Chamorro and the UNO’s defeat of the Sandinistas in the 1990 election
only further contributed to Nicaragua’s inability to properly address illiteracy, as
Chamorro’s conservative administration cut all areas of social spending, particularly
education.
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Cuba remains a bastion of literacy with one of the lowest levels of illiteracy in the
entire world; however, many continue to question the validity of Cuba’s claims of having
approximately 29c illiteracy. In comparison with Nicaragua’s 22.5% rate of illiteracy
among people older than 15, Cuba has certainly been more successful in preserving the
gains made during their Literacy Campaign through extensive investment in educational
251

projects for both Cuban children and adults,

Nicaragua’s efforts to eliminate illiteracy,

although valiant, eventually proved less successful than their earlier Cuban counterpart.
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